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ABSTRACT
MOHAMMAD RASHEDUL HASAN. Topology-aware approach for the emergence
of social norms in multiagent systems. (Under the direction of DR. ANITA RAJA)
Social norms facilitate agent coordination and conflict resolution without explicit
communication. Norms generally involve restrictions on a set of actions or behaviors
of agents to a particular strategy and can significantly reduce the cost of coordination.
There has been recent progress in multiagent systems (MAS) research to develop a
deep understanding of the social norm formation process. This includes developing
mechanisms to create social norms in an effective and efficient manner. The hypoth-
esis of this dissertation is that equipping agents in networked MAS with “network
thinking” capabilities and using this contextual knowledge to form social norms in
an effective and efficient manner improves the performance of the MAS. This disser-
tation investigates the social norm emergence problem in conventional norms (where
there is no conflict between individual and collective interests) and essential norms
(where agents need to explicitly cooperate to achieve socially-efficient behavior) from
a game-theoretic perspective. First, a comprehensive investigation of the social norm
formation problem is performed in various types of networked MAS with an emphasis
on the effect of the topological structures on the process. Based on the insights gained
from these network-theoretic investigations, novel topology-aware decentralized mech-
anisms are developed that facilitate the emergence of social norms suitable for various
environments. It addresses the convention emergence problem in both small and large
conventional norm spaces and equip agents to predict the topological structure to use
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the suitable convention mechanisms. It addresses the cooperation emergence prob-
lem in the essential norm space by harnessing agent commitments and altruism where
appropriate. Extensive simulation based experimentation has been conducted on dif-
ferent network topologies by varying the topological features and agent interaction
models. Comparisons with state-of-the-art norm formation techniques show that pro-
posed mechanisms facilitate significant improvement in performance in a variety of
networks.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Social norms are expectations of an agent about the behavior of other agents in
society. They involve imposing restriction on a set of actions or behaviors of agents
to a particular strategy. By adhering to a social norm, agents are able to achieve
coordination and resolve conflicts without explicit communications. Social norms
can reduce the uncertainty and complexity, and increase the reliability of the sys-
tem [53, 68]. They help to reduce coordination overhead through simplifying agents’
decision-making process by prescribing action choices in specific situations [78]. For
example, by forming social norms, agent behavior can be regulated in an efficient
manner in virtual societies such as electronic institutions [17] and agent-supported
virtual enterprises [18]. Also, coordination and conflict resolution in the emerging
field of social services computing [36] and ad-hoc sensor network applications [5] can
be achieved efficiently by creating social norms. Therefore, establishing a social norm
acts as a useful mechanism for deciding the dominant coordination strategy and fa-
cilitating consensus.
Open and dynamic Multiagent systems (MAS) require a social norm formulation
approach that is distributed and evolves to adapt to changes in the environment.
Unlike social systems in which the objective is to understand and predict the popula-
tion level behavior based on empirically supported interaction rules (e.g., emergence
and evolution of languages [46] or opinion formation [11]), artificial societies require
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participants to use mechanisms that give rise to fast and efficient convergence to a
global norm. Therefore, designing mechanisms suitable for dynamic and large-scale
MAS is the main concern of this dissertaion.
1.1 Motivation
With the increase of the number of users in online social networks (in March 2014
Facebook reported to have 802 million daily active users on average1) and growing
interest in virtual communities for entertainment, business, commerce and socio-
political reasons, the issue of norm emergence or global consensus formation in a
decentralized fashion has become more topical [60, 38, 22]. We discuss three applica-
tion scenarios below that underscore the importance of understanding and developing
norm emergence mechanisms in virtual societies.
Motivating Application 1: Data on online social networks have great commercial value
to marketing companies, competing networking sites and identity thieves. With the
emergence of new web technologies, public developers are able to interface and extend
the online websites services as applications (for example, in Facebook). Proposing
a fine-grained access control model for controlling application access to the online
social network user data does not solve the problem of extension vulnerabilities. This
is because users might deny all the permissions or deny a subset of the permissions,
thereby rendering the app non-usable. Moreover, it would be difficult for the app
developers to design apps based on these diverse policy preferences. Therefore, it
would be preferable for the users to reach a consensus on a preferred set of privacy
1http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
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settings or privacy conventions so that the app developers could easily design their
apps to target these small number of privacy conventions [27]. For example, users
with conservative privacy inclinations [33] would align with a group of other users in
their neighborhood that share the similar preferences. It would enable the users to
select exactly one from the set of privacy profiles instead of specifying their preference
for each of the requested permissions. This would ensure security with minimum user
intervention as well as allow the users to enjoy the advanced app features.
Motivating Application 2: In collaborative tagging systems, such as Flickr, del.icio.us,
CiteULike or Connotea, human web-users self-organize a system of tags to create
and maintain social networks for sharing information [13]. This categorization sys-
tem is useful for navigating through a large and heterogeneous body of resources.
The existing works that are grounded in real tagging sites indicate the significance
of developing deeper mechanisms for understanding the complex statistical behav-
ior of the tagging dynamics. The key problem that requires deep investigation is:
how does microscopic tagging activity of users result in the emergence of global cat-
egorization/convention in a decentralized fashion and how could such categorization
formation be made faster?
Motivating Application 3: In the social networking and microblogging site Twitter2,
a common way of adding additional context and metadata to the short text messages
or tweets is by using hashtags. It is a community-driven activity to create conven-
tions. Hashtags are similar to tags used in Flickr. These are added inline to the tweet
posts. It is a simple way for users to search for tweets that have a common topic.
2https://twitter.com/
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Unlike traditional tagging systems used for information archival, Twitter hashtags
can serve either as a label for identifying topically relevant streams of message or a
prompt for commenting and sharing. Hashtags are more than labels for contextualiz-
ing statements, objects for bookmarking, or channels for sharing information. They
are active virtual sites for constructing communities. Hashtags are used both as a
topical identifier (e.g., #samsunggalaxy) and a symbol of a community membership
(e.g., #worldforpeace) [39]. During the “Arab Spring” and other protests, activists
used hashtags to coordinate their actions. There are several issues regarding hash-
tagging in Twitter that require deeper understanding, such as: how the use of novel
hashtags co-evolve with the needs of their users in the presence of other hashtags?
Why do some hashtags persist while others are just momentary blips? How do simi-
lar hashtags compete for attention? Why do users adopt some hashtags while reject
others?
The issues and questions discussed in relation to the above three application scenar-
ios motivate us to formulate the central research question in this dissertation which is
to understand the process of norm emergence in virtual societies and to develop agent-
based mechanisms to make such emergence faster and effective. The problem of norm
emergence in these virtual societies characterized by large size, dynamic structure and
complex network properties (e.g., degree-distribution in Facebook follows power-law
form [12]), require an understanding of the structural properties of these systems and
the effect of these properties on the process of norm formation. While the problem
of norm emergence is not new in MAS, formulating the problem within the space
of virtual societies enables this research to break novel ground in computer science
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research. Our initiative is inspired by John Hopcroft’s remark on the importance of
creating a scientific base for understanding the dynamics of the emerging large sys-
tems for which the existing tools in computer science are not sufficient3. The research
goal of this dissertation is to perform a systematic and detailed investigation of the
norm emergence problem in virtual societies. To do this, we develop a framework
that captures the core research challenges of these real-world applications and uses
a multiagent simulation based approach to investigate the various dimensions of the
problem.
1.2 Problem Description
The study of the collective behavior of agents that includes social norm emer-
gence in social and artificial systems has recently witnessed a burgeoning body of
literature emphasizing the topological properties of these systems [21, 10]. These
approaches consider the agents (social or artificial) to be situated on the nodes of
connected graphs and their interactions are captured through the edges among the
nodes. It has been observed that many of these agent networks exhibit complex net-
work properties such as heterogeneity in the connectivity pattern, short path-length,
high clustering and assortativity [42]. Therefore, it is our belief that Network Science
is the natural framework for investigating the emergent global behavior of these sys-
tems. Advances in the understanding of complex networks have made it possible to
investigate the potential implications of the topological properties of the networks on
various dynamical processes including social norm formation in networked MAS.
3“Future Directions in Computer Science Research”, WI-IAT keynote address, Atlanta, Georgia
Nov. 19, 2013.
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A rich stream of MAS research is devoted to the investigation of the influence of
agent social network of interactions on the evolution of the norm emergence pro-
cess [31, 19, 53, 76, 68, 56, 75, 1, 23]. Due to agent’s partial observability of their
neighborhood in networked MAS, norm propagation and adaptation becomes chal-
lenging. The existing mechanisms include various strategy update rules and social
instruments to create norm in MAS organized as different types of networks (see
Figure 1). Some researches make a strong claim that some networks are supposed
to be better than others for promoting norms. For example, scale-free topologies
are more efficient than small-world topologies for norm emergence [19, 23]. Many
of these works use narrow investigations (with limited and fixed network parameters
settings) to derive such generic conclusions. However, if we dig deeper into this is-
sue, we observe that the performance of the scale-free networks significantly differs
with the variation of topological properties of the network. For example, the algo-
rithm [19] that claims the performance superiority of scale-free networks in general
has been shown to fail in sparsely-connected scale-free networks [28]. Also, problems
where an agent’s preference over an action/norm is in conflict with the social welfare,
highly-connected scale-free MAS networks are shown to be the most detrimental for
cooperation (norm) formation [47]. Therefore, in many cases it is misleading or even
false to claim that some topologies are in general better than other topologies. These
observations motivate us to extensively investigate the role of network topology on
the process of norm emergence. More specifically, we intend to investigate: which
parameter configurations of a specific topology facilitate efficient norm formation and
under what conditions?
7
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Z 
Figure 1: Mechanism design landscape.
While there have been some works that study the influence of network topol-
ogy on norm creation, there is a lack of effort to harness the topological knowledge
gained from these studies into the agent’s decision-making process. To the best of
our knowledge, none of the existing mechanisms use topological insights to facili-
tate topologically-aware decision-making. In open and dynamic MAS where the local
neighborhood topology of the agents continuously changes, it is imperative for agents
to adapt their norm emergence mechanisms and include topology-awareness in their
decision-making process. Moreover, the knowledge that Network Science offers on the
relationship between the topological properties and the dynamical processes can be
used by the agents to make the norm emergence mechanisms more efficient.
To summarize, the central theme of this work that crosscuts a conglomerate body of
research concerning norm emergence is the enhancement of this process by endowing
the agents with topology-awareness (Figure 1). For informed decision making, agents
are enabled to use the knowledge that is hidden in the topological structure of their
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neighborhood. Therefore, they are endowed with the capability of “network thinking”.
This includes the ability of agents to (i) predict of the global topological structure of
the network based on local agent neighborhood data and use convention formation
mechanisms suitable for that network topology, (ii) leverage social influence based on
the degree-distribution of the agent neighborhood to augment norm formation, (iii)
use the best possible network formation parameters to facilitate norm convergence.
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that equipping agents in networked MAS
with “network thinking” capability facilitates the emergence of social norms in an
effective and efficient manner.
1.3 Overview of the Approach
Previously we argued that sparsely-connected scale-free networks do not favor con-
vention emergence [19] while the same network configurations are ideal for cooperation
emergence [47]. This apparent contradiction leads us to identify another dimension
of the norm emergence problem namely different types of agent interactions in MAS.
In his work [74], Villatoro used a taxonomy of social norms that is based on Cole-
man’s categorization [16]. We use Villatoro’s taxonomy that splits the general prob-
lem of social norm emergence into two categories from a game-theoretic perspective:
conventional norms and essential norms (Figure 2). These two categories differenti-
ate the inherent challenges present in each type of interaction and formulate suitable
mechanisms.
In conventional norms4, a group of agents tries to decide to adopt a behavioral
4Henceforth this is referred as conventions.
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Figure 2: Villatoro’s taxonomy for the norm emergence problem.
strategy from a given set [74]. There are no good reasons to prefer one strategy
over the other and even the collective selection is arbitrary. It assumes no conflict
in interest between the individual and the collective interests. Typically this type of
problem is modeled using a pure-coordination game in which two equally beneficial
convention alternatives exist [19], i.e., the available convention space is small. We
also investigate convention emergence problems that involve large convention spaces.
A special type of game, i.e., language game, is used to model these large convention
space problems [23].
Essential norms, on the other hand, try to resolve conflicts between the individual
and collective interests in applications where the individual and collective goals can
be widely different [74]. It is applicable for scenarios in which individuals do not have
incentives for cooperation. Formation of essential norms enables agents to cooperate
and thereby achieve socially-efficient behavior. Similar to Villatoro’s work, we ap-
proach the the problem of essential norm formation in the light of the “Emergence
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of Cooperation”. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game captures the inherent social dilemma
between the individual and the society and hence is used to model the emergence of
cooperation problem.
In this dissertation, we investigate the problem of convention emergence within the
space of conventional norms and cooperation emergence within the space of essential
norms in the context of a MAS (Figure 2). Agents in the MAS can be organized
as regular, random, small-world or scale-free networks. We consider both static and
dynamic networks. In a dynamic network the links between the agents change over
time while in static networks links remain unchanged.
We perform an especially detailed investigation of scale-free networks. In scale-
free networks the node degree follows power-law distribution independent of the scale
of the network, a feature suitable for large-scale MAS. Also the scale-free structure
is robust against self mutation and environmental perturbation. Many real-world
networks from biological to artificial domains, such as protein interaction networks,
Internet, World Wide Web, etc., display similar scale-free property [8, 9]. Unlike many
previous approaches, we distinguish the challenges inherent in different types of scale-
free networks and perform an exhaustive investigation. For example, we address the
challenges of norm emergence in sparse, moderate, and densely-connected scale-free
networks. Also we investigate scale-free networks with various levels of clustering.
We adopt a network-theoretic approach towards the norm formation problem. This
approach aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem of social
norm formation in various types of networked MAS with an emphasis on the effect of
the topological structures on norm formation process (Figure 3). We investigate two
11
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Figure 3: Norm emergence landscape.
types of agent interactions that include situations with no conflict in interest among
the agents (conventional norm) and conflict in interest (essential norm). For conven-
tional norm, both the small and large convention space is considered. In our work,
small convention spaces have exactly two convention alternatives while large conven-
tion spaces have three or more alternatives. For example, in our language convention
problem we considered a convention space of size 1010 (Chapter 3). Then, based on
the insights gained from network-theoretic investigations, we develop novel topology-
aware mechanisms that in conjunction with socially-inspired techniques facilitate the
emergence of social norms suitable for various environments. We emphasize the abil-
ity of the agents in networked MAS to adopt “network thinking” capability to form
social norms in an effective (a large majority of the society converges into a stable
12
norm) and efficient (fast convergence) manner.
1.4 Research Goals
Since we address the problem of social norm emergence from two perspectives, we
require different set of tools to solve the problems. Therefore, for the sake of clarity,
we distinguish two sets of research goals for the two categories of norm.
Research Goals Set 1 - Emergence of Convention: We plan to explore the problem
of emergence of convention both in small and large convention space (Figure 4).
Following are our research goals with respect to these two convention spaces:
Norm 
Emergence
Conventional 
Norm
Essential 
Norm
Emergence 
of 
Cooperation
No conflict between 
individual & collective 
interests
Conflict exists 
between individual & 
collective interests
Emergence 
of 
Convention
Altruistic Agent 
based Approach
Commitment 
based Coalition 
Formation
Large 
Convention 
Space
Small 
Convention 
Space
Figure 4: Research goals for convention and cooperation emergence.
Small Convention Space:
• RG1: We will investigate whether the existing simple distributed mechanisms
are able to create a convention across various topologies. If not, then we need
13
to figure out which mechanisms work across which networks or whether new
mechanisms are needed to be designed for a particular topology. Due to the
small size of convention space, we will not consider the time efficiency of the
mechanism and will only focus on its solvability.
• RG2: We will identify the convention formation related challenges inherent
in various types of scale-free networks (various average degree networks) and
propose an efficient technique to resolve that.
• RG3: We plan to design a topology-aware meta reasoning process that enables
agents to predict the topology of the network and automatically apply the
suitable convention formation mechanism for that topology.
Large Convention Space:
• RG4: With the increase of the size of convention space, the problem becomes
complex and requires more time and resource to converge into a single con-
vention. Therefore, the key challenges of large convention space are to form
conventions faster and to ensure that the quality of the emergent convention is
high. We plan to design a topology-aware mechanism that is able to create a
high-quality convention fast as compared to the state-of-the-art mechanisms.
• RG5: Unlike small convention space, existing approaches did not consider dy-
namic networks in large convention space. Therefore, we plan to implement
a dynamic network model in large convention space that augments convention
emergence process.
• RG6: We intend to identify the challenges of convention formation over different
types of scale-free networks.
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Research Goals Set 2 - Emergence of Cooperation: We address the emergence of
cooperation problem for MAS that are organized as scale-free networks. Our litera-
ture review on this topic (in Chapter 2) indicates that the existing mechanisms are
able to form cooperation in scale-free networks with only limited success when the
networks are sparsely connected (average node degree is small) [29]. Moderate and
highly-connected scale-free networks remain mostly unexplored domains for coopera-
tion emergence. We plan to design two mechanisms to solve this problem (Figure 4).
The first mechanism (discussed in Chapter 4.1) uses commitment based dynamic
coalition formation technique and complex network dynamics to form cooperation in
moderately-connected scale-free networks (where the average node degree is 20). The
second mechanism (discussed in Chapter 4.2) considers highly-connected scale-free
networks (where the average node degree is up to 50) and uses heterogeneous system
design that includes a small fraction of altruistic agents. Following are our research
goals with respect to these two mechanisms:
Dynamic Coalition Formation:
• RG7: We plan to build a dynamic coalition formation approach based on the
topological features of the agent scale-free network. More specifically, we want
to enable the agents to reason about the commitment based coalition formation
using the topology of the network. Our goal is to both analytically and empir-
ically establish the correlation between the coalition formation process and the
scale-free network topology.
• RG8: We will investigate how the agents can self-organize the network of their
neighborhood such that it augments the global coalition formation. We will
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build a computational model to design an appropriate partner selection strat-
egy for the agents that results in the emergence of a single coalition. This
computational model will exhaustively investigate the process of coalition for-
mation by varying the model parameters of scale-free networks such as minimum
node-degree, degree-heterogeneity and clustering coefficient.
Altruistic Agent Based Approach:
• RG9: We plan to design a heterogeneous system design approach based on
altruistic agents to establish cooperation.
• RG10: We will investigate exhaustively the efficacy of the altruistic agent based
approach by varying the model parameters.
1.5 Contributions
The problem of social norm emergence in MAS spans across multiple dimensions
and the existing works have covered only a fraction of this challenging terrain [63, 78,
31, 19, 53, 61, 20, 41, 76, 68, 56, 75, 1, 23]. Some of the relevant works are reviewed in
Chapter 2. While these approaches offer useful mechanisms for creating norms, often
times over-simplified assumptions limit the applicability of the solutions in real-world
domains. For example, many works consider the MAS to be a static system [23]
or consider fixed parameter settings for network investigation to arrive at a general
conclusion [19]. This dissertation contributes to the existing gaps in the state-of-
the-art approaches by exploring two dimensions of the norm emergence landscape
(Figure 3). In the mechanism design landscape, our proposed novel topology-aware
approach adds a new dimension to the space previously consists of strategy update
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rules and socially inspired instruments (see Figure 1). Our main contributions, C1
- C3, cover the two social norm categories: convention emergence and cooperation
emergence. The first contribution involves convention emergence while the last two
are on cooperation emergence:
C1: Topology-Aware Mechanisms to Facilitate Convention Emergence
We accomplish the research goals RG1-RG6 by proposing topology-aware (TA)
mechanisms that enable agents to adopt “network thinking” to form conventions both
in small and large convention space. For problems involving small convention space,
we argue that no existing single simple distributed mechanism can create convention
across various topologies. This hypothesis is both analytically and experimentally
verified. We identify that while the existing state-of-the-art mechanism claims to form
conventions across small-world, random and scale-free networks, it actually fails to
resolve the stable sub-convention problem in sparse scale-free topologies. We propose
a novel socially inspired technique to solve the convention emergence problem in sparse
as well as in dense scale-free networks. The need for recognizing the neighborhood
topology has been emphasized in order to use suitable convention mechanisms. A
topology-aware convention selection mechanism is proposed that solves the convention
emergence problem across both random and various types of scale-free networks.
In order to address the problem within a large convention space, we design a
topology-aware mechanism that is able to create a social convention on various types
of dynamic networks. We hypothesize that if agents are endowed with the capability
of “network thinking” for decision-making, the convention formation process becomes
faster and efficient. To validate this hypothesis, we use a language coordination prob-
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lem for investigation. According to this problem, a society of agents construct a
common lexicon in a decentralized fashion. Agents’ interactions are modeled using a
language game in which agents send their lexicons to their neighbors and update their
lexicon based on the utility values of the received lexicons. A topology-aware utility
computation mechanism is proposed that enables the agents to expedite the conven-
tion formation process. Moreover, to further augment this process, a socially-inspired
technique, the power of diversity, is used. Agents are enabled to bring diversity in
the population through a novel network reorganization technique that is based on
the lexicon utility. Extensive simulation results indicate that the proposed mecha-
nism is both effective (able to converge into a large majority convention state with
more than 90% agents sharing a high-quality lexicon) and efficient (faster). In addi-
tion to this, the efficacy of the topology-aware mechanism is tested by varying the
topological features to develop an understanding about how the topology influences
convention formation process. The conditions under which diversity brings benefit
are also investigated.
C2: Emergence of Cooperation using Commitment based Dynamic Coalition Forma-
tion and Complex Network Dynamics
This contribution accomplishes research goals RG7-RG8. In order to achieve the
emergence of cooperation in self-interested agent societies operating on moderately-
connected scale-free networks, agents are enabled to control topological features dur-
ing the network formation phase. Based on an extensive investigation of complex
networks dynamics, agents are endowed with the “network thinking” capability for
informed decision-making. A commitment-based dynamic coalition formation ap-
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proach is proposed that results in a single coalition where agents mutually cooperate.
Agents play an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with their immediate neighbors
and offer commitments to their wealthiest neighbors in order to form coalitions. A
commitment proposal, that includes a high breaching-penalty, incentivizes opponent
agents to form coalitions within which they mutually cooperate and thereby increase
their payoff. We argue analytically, and substantiate experimentally, how the value of
the penalty should be set with respect to the minimum node degree and the payoff val-
ues such that convergence into optimal coalitions is possible. Using a computational
model, we determine an appropriate partner selection strategy for the agents that
results in a network facilitating the convergence into a single coalition and thereby
maximizing average expected payoff.
C3: Emergence of Cooperation in Highly-Connected Networks Using Altruistic Agents
We achieve the research goals RG9-RG10 through this contribution. We investi-
gate the importance and challenges of establishing cooperation among self-interested
agents in MAS operating on highly-connected scale-free networks that are prevalent
in society and nature. Existing imitation-based approaches for cooperation do not
fare very well in these highly-connected networks. We proposed a stochastic influ-
encer altruistic agent (StIAA) mechanism in which a small proportion of altruistic
agents are introduced in the self-interested MAS. These altruistic agents, irrespec-
tive of their payoff, always cooperate with their neighbors while the self-interested
agents try to maximize their payoff by imitating the wealthiest agents in their neigh-
borhood. To determine optimality of their action choices, the self-interested agents
imitate the cooperative action of their altruistic neighbors (should there be one) with
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a small exploration probability. We show, both analytically and experimentally, that
StIAA performs significantly better in highly-connected networks than the existing
imitation-based approaches. A comprehensive study of the performance of StIAA
shows that it is both robust and scalable.
1.6 How to Read this Dissertation
This dissertation is structured in five chapters that includes:
Chapter 2 provides a background discussion and review of related literature on
the convention emergence and cooperation emergence problems. It scans the existing
body of works that tried to solve these problem in a decentralized fashion. While
following the progress made in this line of research, it identifies some of the gaps and
limitations that are addressed in the next two chapters.
Chapter 3 defines the convention emergence problem suitable for small convention
space first. It presents an argument on why any single distributed mechanism is
unable to create convention across various topologies and substantiates this with
an analytical discussion. It hypothesizes the need for topology prediction by the
agents. A socially inspired technique for convention formation in various types of
scale-free networks is presented followed by a topology-aware convention selection
mechanism. Results from extensive computational investigation supports the tenets
of the proposed mechanism. Then follows the mechanism on large convention space. It
hypothesizes that equiping agents with “network thinking” capability would augment
the convention formation mechanism. It uses a lexicon convention problem to validate
the proposed approach. A topology-aware mechanism is used to solve the problem and
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the comprehensive simulation results are compared with the existing state-of-the-art
mechanisms. Detailed network-theoretic investigations are performed to understand
how various degree-distribution and network reorganization approaches influence the
convention formation process.
Chapter 4 identifies the importance of solving cooperation emergence problem in
both moderately and highly-connected scale-free networks. It presents two mecha-
nisms for solving the problem. First mechanism provides a commitment-based dy-
namic coalition formation technique. A theoretical analysis, substantiated by an
extensive computational investigation, on the relationship between the commitment
parameters and the network properties is discussed. It also equips agents with “net-
work thinking” capability to control network formation and thereby to enhance a
single coalition formation for better cooperation. Second mechanism solves the coop-
eration problem in highly-connected scale-free networks using a heterogeneous system
design technique in which a small fraction of altruistic agents are used. A compre-
hensive simulation validates the robustness and scalability of this approach.
Chapter 5 draws conclusions of various research efforts implemented in this disser-
tation. It also identifies some of the directions in which this research could evolve in
future.
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
This chapter presents a discussion of related literature on the convention and co-
operation emergence problems respectively. It also aims to clearly identify the goals
of this dissertation with respect to the problem of convention emergence that are in
the next two chapters.
2.1 Review of Related Literature on Convention Emergence
Coordination of agent activities in large multiagent systems (MAS) is central to
cooperatively achieving goals. A social convention is considered to be a technique
for increasing coordination [20, 68]. It helps to reduce the overhead of coordination
by simplifying agents’ decision-making process through the determination of action
choices [78]. For example, in online social networks (such as in Facebook) creation
of privacy-setting policy convention for third party applications could be useful for
the both the users and app developers. It could help by tailoring apps based on
the conventions and reduce users privacy risks [27]. Also the mechanism for pre-
dicting conventions in online communities (such as in Twitter) could be useful for
understanding various socio-political phenomena [14, 32].
The distributed convention emergence mechanism has been used to understand,
predict and create conventions in large structured systems including online social
networks [14, 32, 27]. There exist copious amounts of literature that provide useful
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tools to solve this type of convention emergence problem [63, 78, 31, 19, 53, 61, 41, 76,
68, 56, 75, 1, 23]. The first MAS-based decentralized approach to the problem of the
emergence of convention solely through local interaction was addressed by Shoham
and Tennenholtz [62, 63, 64]. They undertook the challenge of designing an appropri-
ate strategy update function as a representation of the agents decision-making pro-
cess that when followed by the entire society would bring global coordination. They
modeled the agent interactions using a 2-dimensional pure coordination (Pure-CG)
and Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game. Their proposed strategy update function called
Highest Cumulative Reward (HCR) rule that uses a reinforcement learning approach.
According to HCR, agents choose the strategy that yielded the highest reward in the
past m interactions. The approach is memory intensive since it stores information on
the history of strategies and the associated rewards. The significance of this strategy
update rule is that when it is followed by the entire society, it converges into a global
convention. The authors have shown that the convention emergence is affected by
the rate of strategy update and interval between memory flushes. The contribution
of their work to the field lies in the fact that it demonstrated how agents strategy
update rule that is based on local information can lead to self-coordination from ini-
tial disorder. However, the agents in their model are able to communicate with any
other agents and their interactions are random. In other words, they did not consider
a structured agent society.
Kittock [31] was the first researcher to investigate the impact of the agent soci-
ety structures on convention emergence. He also used Pure-CG and PD to model
agent interactions and a variation of the HCR strategy update function. He observed
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that the choice of the global structure affects the evolution of the convention. In
particular, he conjectured that the diameter of a network is directly related to the
rate of convergence. His experimentation was limited to regular and fully-connected
networks.
In 1995, Walker and Woolridge [78] modeled the convention problem based on a
Hunter-Gatherer society. According to this model, agents are enabled to move around
the space and can choose a rule from a set of four rules. They proposed a simple
intuitive strategy update function called the Simple Majority Rule that is based on
the strategy of the majority in an agents neighborhood. They experimented with
seven variations of this strategy with a small number of agents on a grid topology.
The proposed simple majority rule brings 100% convergence at a faster rate due to
the agent’s ability to move around the grid
The realm of complex networks was first investigated by Delgado [19]. He used
HCR as well as proposed the Generalized Simple Majority (GSM) strategy update
function that is a stochastic version of Walker and Woolridges Simple Majority Rule.
By modeling agent interactions using Pure-CG, he has shown that both GSM and
HCR successfully converge into a 90% convergence state in complex networks (scale-
free and small-world) as in fully-connected networks. In other words, he proved that a
global convention can be reached at a lower cost (average degree in complex networks
is smaller than that in fully-connected networks). Also he observed that convergence
rate is slower in small-world networks than scale-free networks. He confirmed Kittocks
conjecture that the rate of convergence is proportional to the diameter of the network.
However, GMS fails to create a single convention in sparse scale-free networks.
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The works discussed above that use Pure-CG to model agent interactions do not
distinguish between the quality of the convention alternatives. Pujol et al. [53] varied
the utility of the alternative conventions in a 2-dimensional CG. He experimented
with two types of networks: low-clustered (random and SF) and high-clustered (SW
and fully-connected). He observed that high-clustered system always converged to
the most efficient convention (pareto-efficient) and that convention is stable.
Different types of multiagent learning algorithms were extensively studied by Sen
and Airiau [61]. Instead of trying to select the appropriate strategy update function,
agents use a social learning mechanism, that is similar to the one used by Shoham and
Tannenholtz, in which they learn convention concurrently over repeated private inter-
actions with randomly selected members from the society. They experimented with
three reinforcement learning algorithms and studied the influence of the population
size, the set of possible actions and the heterogeneity of the population on convention
emergence. In addition to attempting to marry between convention emergence and
multiagent learning, they contributed by investigating the impact of fixed-strategy
and non-learning agents on the convention process. However, their agent society
didn’t have any structure and any agent potentially could interact with any other
agent in the society. Mukherjee et al. [41] extended their work by investigating the
impact of the neighborhood size on convention formation using a grid topology. More-
over, they investigated the effect of heterogeneous learning populations on the speed
and nature of norms that emerge through social learning. They have shown that such
distributed and individual learning is indeed a robust mechanism for evolving stable
social norms.
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None of the previous works investigated convention formation in dynamic net-
works except Walker and Woolridge. Another notable exception is the work done by
Savarimuthu et al. [59] in which they used a dynamic network to model the agent
society. Agent interactions are captured using Ultimatum Game and a role model
based mechanism is used to solve the convention problem. In their work, the network
of the agents dynamically changes as they move in a grid world. The authors show
that this dynamic aspect facilitate 100% convergence into a single convention.
In the works discussed thus far, agents choose actions or strategy update functions
based on its utility. Urbano et al. [73] used the weight of the agents to bias the
decision-making process. The weight of the agents is defined based on a measure of
force. The proposed strategy update function Recruitment based on Force with Rein-
forcement (RFR) enables agents to increase their force with successful interactions.
However, in unsuccessful interactions, agents with lower force copies the force and
strategy of the winner. According to RFR, agents first compare its force with its
interaction partner. If the interaction partner’s force is larger than the agent’s force,
it adopts both the convention and the force of its partner by increasing the force a
factor of one. The force attribute should not be considered as the strength of an
individual agent because as it diffuses through imitation it no more belongs to any
agent. Instead it represents the force of the strategy the agent is adopting. The more
the strategy is diffused, the more it will have stronger representatives. This approach
performs well across random, regular, small-world and scale-free networks. However,
Urbano et al. does not associate the force attribute of an agent with its position in
the network (social status).
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To expand the scope of the social learning, Villatoro et al. [75] use two social in-
struments, viz. rewiring and observation, to enhance the emergence of convention.
Rewiring allows agents to control the links they share with other agents by replacing
them intelligently. This direct control of the topology of the social network allows
agents to control whom they interact with, resulting in increased reward without ac-
tually altering the reward function. On the other hand, observation allows agents to
obtain partial information of the convention emergence process by observing other
agents in the neighborhood. They used a 2-person m-action game to model agent
interaction and three strategy selection rules, such as Best Response Rule (BRR),
Highest Cumulative Reward Rule (HCRR) and Memory Based Rule (MBR). They
identify that the meta-stable convention states or sub-conventions prevent the forma-
tion of full convention because of the existence of stable barriers at frontiers. This
phenomenon of sub-conventions is referred as frontier effect. In order to eliminate
this frontier effect, agents are enabled to acquire partial global view (observation)
and control over selecting interacting partners (rewiring). However, their work does
not discuss the cost of using social instruments.
Abdallah [1] solves the problem of frontier effect by adopting an alternative tech-
nique to enable the agents to have a global view of the state of the system. It uses a
hierarchical coordinator based scheme to overcome the frontier effect and establishes
full convention without requiring topological reconfiguration. Agents are grouped
into clusters being monitored by a coordinator and the clusters are organized hier-
archically. Coordinators in each cluster recommend conventions for their clusters.
Leveraging the hierarchical structure, the inconsistencies among the different coordi-
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nators are resolved. It uses a 2-person m-action pure coordination game for agent
interaction and Q-learning method to select actions. In this work, agents of a cluster
acquire partial global view through the coordinators that observe the state of conver-
gence of other clusters. The random hierarchical cluster formation scheme, however,
does not take into account the effect of underlying topological constraints and the
cost of communication between the coordinator and the cluster members.
The space of alternative conventions discussed in the above works is limited only
to two dimensions and these works can be broadly categorized as searching in a
small convention space for a global convention chosen from two possible convention
alternatives. However, in large and open MAS, other challenging issues need to be
considered. First, multiple convention alternatives may exist and hence the conven-
tion space could be complex. Second, it is possible that the existing convention seeds
are not appropriate or of better quality. Therefore, agents may need to create new
convention seeds as well as form a higher-quality convention. Two significant mech-
anisms for solving this type of convention problem are provided in Salazar et al. [56]
and Franks et al. [23]. They investigated a language coordination problem where a
group of agents tries to create a lexicon convention through repeated interactions.
This problem is inspired by Luc Steels’ Naming Game model [65]. Luc Steels focused
mainly on the formation of vocabularies, i.e., a set of mappings between words and
meanings (for instance physical objects). In this context, each agent develops its
own vocabulary in a random private fashion. But agents are forced to align their
vocabularies in order to obtain the benefit of cooperating through communication.
Thus, a globally shared vocabulary emerges as a result of local adjustments of in-
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dividual word-meaning association. The communication evolves through successive
conversations, i.e., events that involve a certain number of agents (two, in practical
implementations) and meanings. The agent society that plays the naming game is
composed of a small number of agents and lacks any structural framework. Moreover,
the scalability of this approach has not been investigated.
The significance of the Salazar et al. [56] and Franks et al. [23] approaches is that
they consider large population of agents modeled using complex small-world and scale-
free networks. In Salazar et al., a sophisticated agent architecture design is proposed
to create high-quality language convention. On the other hand, in Franks et al., a
set of privileged agents (influencer agents) equipped with high-quality lexicons are
deployed to influence and expedite the convention formation process. However, these
approaches do not reason about the costs associated with the sophisticated agent
architecture design to those for the deployment and maintenance of the influencer
agents. Moreover, the agent network is assumed to be static and requires a long time
to converge into a large majority convention state.
The above discussion on related literature reveals lack of attention in the following
areas: (1) although agents use smart strategy update functions and various instru-
ments to expedite the speed of convergence, no work seems to leverage the topological
knowledge for intelligent decision-making; (2) a rigorous and extensive study on all
types of complex networks with variation of topological-parameters is missing; (3)
there is no silver bullet to solve the convention problem; different mechanisms are
needed for different environments with varying topologies, interactions etc.; there-
fore, there is a need for the agents’ ability to predict the topology in which they are
29
situated and then to use the most suitable mechanism; (4) there is a lack of extensive
research on dynamic networks and finally (5) a deeper investigation on mechanisms
for larger convention space is required.
2.2 Review of Related Literature on Cooperation Emergence
Essential norms cover the space of social norms that aims to resolve collective action
problems in which there exists conflicts between individual and collective interests. In
this type of problem, individuals are tempted not to contribute towards the common
goal and their individual behavior may affect the welfare of the society. This conflict
between the individual and the collective interests can be resolved by creating a social
norm of cooperation. Therefore, formulating the problem as a cooperation emergence
problem captures the characteristics of the essential norm problem. Here we present
a discussion of related literature on the emergence of cooperation problem.
There has been a great deal of interest in the MAS community about the emergence
and maintenance of cooperation among artificial agents. One of the challenging ques-
tions addressed is to design autonomous systems in which agents work together to
achieve common shared goals. Traditionally the tension between personal and social
goal is modeled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. The PD game offers a power-
ful metaphor for understanding the challenges of the emergence of cooperation in the
face of myopic selfish behavior. In PD, selfish and rational agents try to maximize
their utility while interacting with each other. In a one-shot version of this PD game,
the only dominant strategy equilibrium is defection which is not Pareto-efficient [45].
For cooperation to emerge, agents need to play the PD game repeatedly and use
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suitable strategy update functions. Axelord [7] has shown that the “tit-for-tat” strat-
egy facilitates cooperation when PD game is played repeatedly among two agents.
However, in unstructured MAS, repeated random interactions do not guarantee the
evolution of cooperation [29]. Nowak [43] argues that in well-mixed populations solely
natural selection based strategy update functions do not facilitate cooperation. He
provided five rules or mechanisms that along with natural selection helped to emerge
cooperation.
Unlike well-mixed populations, in structured societies where agents interact only
with a sub-set of the population, socially inspired strategy update functions has been
shown to emerge and sustain cooperation. Nowak and May [45] successfully used a
simple deterministic imitation based strategy update function (imitate-best-neighbor
or IB) on grid topology in which agents imitate the strategy of their best performing
neighbors including itself (those who has the largest aggregate payoff from the PD
game). Santos et al. [58] used a stochastic version of this imitation-based strategy
update function (stochastic-imitate-random-neighbor or SA) to achieve cooperation
on moderately-connected SF networks. According to this stochastic imitation rule,
for each agent i one neighbor j is chosen randomly. Then if j’s payoff is larger than
i’s payoff, i imitates j’s strategy with a probability. SA increases the final fraction
of cooperators with the heterogeneity of the degrees. However, these strategy update
functions do not always guarantee cooperative behavior in structured MAS, nor do
they establish full cooperation. Moreover, these imitation based approaches fail to
facilitate cooperation in highly-connected scale-free networks [47, 29].
One significant approach towards solving the cooperation problem in highly-connected
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scale-free networks used the evolution of social network of interactions as well as the
evolution of strategies [49]. These two evolutions follow different time-scales and it
has been shown how this variation could affect the process of cooperation evolution.
However, the cost of link rewiring is not included in the payoff calculation of the
agents.
To solve the problem of evolution of cooperation with the goal of establishing full co-
operation, several coalition formation mechanisms have been proposed. The dynamic
coalition formation approach that is reviewed here differs from the existing coali-
tion/team formation approaches in the MAS research community. Coalition/team
formation mechanisms require the agents to consider all other agents in the network
making the process computationally intractable for large networks [54, 24]. Moreover,
their agents are constrained to stay in a coalition until the goals of the coalition are
accomplished. While these works emphasize the design of negotiation protocols and
efficient task distribution, the goal of the following works is to promote cooperation
at the network level.
Salazar et al. [55] used a single coalition emergence approach for achieving full
cooperation in MAS structured as complex networks. Using Axelrod’s tribute/tax
framework, they developed a centralized leader based coalition formulation model over
complex networks where the agents pay an amount of tax to the leaders in order to join
a coalition. They have shown that their distributed information sharing consensus
mechanism effectively reduces the tax rate imposed by the leader. However, both the
leader tax collection and information sharing require maintenance of network-wide
multi-hop communication which would incur overhead cost. Moreover, they did not
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investigate the variation of topological features and its impact on their algorithms,
and considered the underlying network as a pre-established, fixed configuration and
static platform.
Peleteiro et al. [51] developed a similar coalition formation approach for enhanc-
ing cooperation over complex networks. Agents use learning automata techniques
to adopt appropriate actions. After joining a coalition agents decide their actions
towards the coalition members and the outsiders using a centralized voting method.
However, no analysis of the voting method is given and hence it’s not clear whether it
is a centralized or decentralized scheme. Also the independent agents require to keep
histories of their previous actions, but the impact of memory size is not analyzed.
Han et al. [4] used commitment to facilitate the emergence of cooperation in a pop-
ulation of agents that play non-iterated PD game. They have used a variant of the
PD payoff matrix is defined to incorporate the penalty and commitment management
cost and thereby to provide sufficient incentives for the agents to consider the advan-
tage of mutual cooperation. Their work is based on an unstructured population with
random interactions among the agents that use a social learning model and mutation
for strategy adaptation. However, they did not consider the effect of their approach
in iterated PD game and the role of network topology.
The impact of the topological features of complex networks on the emergence of
cooperation has been studied by a band of physicists in the framework of evolutionary
game theory. Santos et al. [57] has shown that the heterogeneous degree distribution
in scale-free networks affects the cooperative behavior significantly. However in the
context of social systems there are other topological features that need to be consid-
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ered, e.g. impact of average degree, degree-degree correlation, clustering coefficient
etc. The impact of average degree is tested on the scale-free, small-world and random
networks by Tang et al. [71], and it has been shown that the outcome of the PD game
is affected by the average degree of networks as the density of cooperators reaches its
peak at specific values of average degree. The effect of high clustering over scale-free
networks has been studied by Assenza et al. [6] where each node plays a PD game
with its neighbors, and it is observed that cooperation can be significantly enhanced
when clustering coefficient of the network is very high. Vukov et al. [77] has shown
that if the players of the PD game over scale-free networks are endowed with basic
cognitive abilities, such as the ability to distinguish their partners by remembering
their last action, they could adopt reactive strategies by taking into account the past
actions of the neighbors to establish high level of cooperation. This mechanism iso-
lates the defectors and converts them into cooperators. But this approach requires
memory-enabled agents and incurs extra cost.
The above topology-based works investigates only the domain of static complex
networks. These networks are neither dynamic, nor they change/grow over time.
Poncela et al. [52] studied the emergence of cooperation using a network growth model
that is based on an evolutionary preferential attachment algorithm. The fitness of each
node is defined as proportional to the accrued payoff from the PD game. New nodes
are preferentially linked with the high fitness existing nodes and play the PD game
with its neighbors accordingly. The resultant network is shown to be heterogeneous
with the scale-free property. This work provides a useful understanding about how
the microscopic dynamics could lead to the co-evolution of the structure and the
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macroscopic behavior of the SF network. However, the emergence of full cooperation
seems to be impossible if the payoff for the temptation to defect is larger than the
payoff for the reward.
The above research makes room for further investigation in the following direc-
tions: (1) both the coalition formation and commitment based approaches do not
extensively study the impact of the variation of the topological features on coopera-
tion emergence; for example, it needs to be investigated how the cost associated with
the commitment based approach, such as penalty, is related to the topology of the
network; (2) highly-connected complex networks pose challenge to emerge and sustain
cooperation and the only existing approach relies on expensive rewiring mechanism;
therefore, it is important to figure out a less-expensive solution for highly-connected
networks (3) a more realistic system-design approach could be pursued to complement
the strategy update functions for cooperation formation; for example, instead of us-
ing a homogeneous agent society, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of
heterogeneous agents (that may include both self-interested and altruistic agents) on
cooperation emergence.
CHAPTER 3: EMERGENCE OF CONVENTION
In a convention emergence problem, typically agents have to choose conventions
from a set of convention alternatives or convention seeds. Hence, the size of the con-
vention space could be small or large. In this chapter we present two mechanisms for
convention emergence suitable for both small and large convention spaces respectively.
3.1 Topology-Aware Mechanism for Small Convention Space
3.1.1 Research Goals
Convention emergence problems for small convention space is typically modeled
using pure-coordination game [63, 78, 31, 19, 53, 61, 41, 76, 68, 1]. In this type of
problem, agents has two convention alternatives to choose from.
Previously we discussed (in Chapter 2) that although the state-of-the-art Gener-
alized Simple Majority (GSM) mechanism [19] claims that it is able to form a single
convention in scale-free and small-world networks, it fails to do so across all types
of scale-free networks. This motivates us to propose a simple distributed mechanism
that works across all types of scale-free networks. Our hypothesis is that no single
distributed mechanism is able to form convention across all topologies. Therefore, it
is important to design a mechanism that enables the agents to first recognize their
global topological structure and then to choose a suitable mechanism for convention
convergence for that particular topology.
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To summarize, we emphasize the significance of employing “network thinking”
by the agents to control their dynamics (choosing appropriate convention-selection
mechanism) and the dynamical processes of the network (convention emergence).
We set the following sub-goals with regard to the emergence of convention in small
convention space (EC-SCS) to achieve research goals RG1 - RG3 that we outlined in
Chapter 1(page 12):
• EC-SCS1: Show that the existing state-of-the-art mechanism (that is the Gen-
eralized Simple Majority (GSM) mechanism) [73, 34] fails to form convention
over sparse SF networks. This enables us to establish our hypothesis that no
simple distributed mechanism, such as GSM, works across all types of networks.
• EC-SCS2: Design an efficient mechanism that forms convention in sparse as
well as all types of scale-free networks.
• EC-SCS3: Design a topology-aware meta mechanism that enables the agents to
predict the global topological structure of their network based on local neigh-
borhood information and use suitable convention selection algorithms.
3.1.2 Problem Formulation
A formal definition of the convention problem includes the following components:
(a) the interaction model that describes the interaction architecture, (b) a coordina-
tion game model that captures the agent interaction, and (c) the information propa-
gation model that specifies the amount, type and direction of information exchange.
A solution to this convention problem is the one in which a large majority of the
agents converge into a single convention in a reasonable amount of time.
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3.1.2.1 The Interaction Model
The agent interactions in the MAS are purely local and are constrained by an
undirected graph G(V,E) where V is the set of vertices (or nodes), E ⊆ V x V
is the set of edges and n is the number of nodes. Once the graph or the network
is formed by the agents, it becomes fixed. Two nodes vi and vj are neighbors if
(vi, vj) ∈ E. The neighborhood N(i) is the set of nodes adjacent to vi. That is,
N(i) = {vj|(vi, vj)} ∈ E ⊂ V and |N(i)| is the degree of node vi. The adjacent
agents (within single-hop distance) are defined as the neighbors.
Two types of graphs are used for investigation, (1) Barabasi-Albert (BA) model of
scale-free network [8] and (2) random network. In future, other graph types can be
considered.
3.1.2.2 The Coordination Game Model
The agent interactions are captured by a 2-person, 2-action symmetric coordination
game. This game is used to model a small convention space. Every agent is equipped
to play this game with each one of its neighbors and their interactions are represented
by the network links. The agents start playing the coordination game after the
network is formed and the final network is considered as a closed system.
Every agent either chooses convention X or convention Y while playing the game
with each one of its neighbors. Therefore, the convention space consists of two al-
ternative conventions: X or Y. A social convention is reached when a large majority
of the agents choose either X or Y convention consistently. The game is perfect but
incomplete information based so that the agents do not know the payoff of their
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neighbors but are able to see the current conventions of their neighbors.
In a 2-person, 2-action coordination game setting these two conventions intersect
at four possible outcomes represented by designated payoffs: RXX and RY Y for both
adopting the same convention; and RXY and RY X for adopting different conventions.
The payoff matrix is represented by Table 1. A pure coordination game is used that
satisfies the following payoff conditions: RXX = RY Y = +1 and RXY = RY X = -1.
Therefore, while reaching a convention is profitable, agents do not distinguish between
the quality of the two conventions.
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the coordination Game
X Y
X (RXX) (RXY )
Y (RY X) (RY Y )
3.1.2.3 Information Propagation Model
A spreading-based mechanism is used for the information propagation model be-
cause of its appealing speed of reaching a convention [19, 53]. In these spreading-based
approaches, agents propagate some characteristics (conventions) over the members of
the society to influence them to adopt it. Agents have access to the state of the
current conventions of their neighbors. Neighbors provide this information when an
agent makes such request. From real-world applications perspective, this assumption
seems feasible. For example, in online social networks, participants are able to see
their neighbors conventions [27]. The communication channel is assumed to be error-
free. Since the agent communication is limited only within their local neighborhood,
the cost associated with their communication is not considered.
39
3.1.2.4 GSM’s Failure in Scale-free Networks
In this Subsection the previous theoretical argument that GSM leads to the con-
vergence into a single convention in SF networks is disproved.
Theorem 1. For any undirected random scale-free graph the Generalized Simple Ma-
jority (GSM) action update rule does not always lead the network towards a single
convention.
Proof. Theorem 1 is proved by using a counter example that negates the theoretical
argument in [19] and establishes the claim made in Theorem 1.
X
X
Y
X Y
X
Y
X
Figure 5: Small SF network.
Figure 5 shows a small SF network of 8 agents in which the minimum node de-
gree is 1. Agents play a pure coordination game with their immediate neighbors and
update their actions using the GSM rule. Figure 5 captures a snapshot of the con-
vention evolution process where 5 agents adopted convention X and 3 agents adopted
convention Y. As long as the network follows GSM, the two middle nodes would not
change their current conventions in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, it can be
noticed that a stable barrier exists between the two middle nodes that is preventing
the convergence into a single convention. In this type of setting, emergence of a single
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convention is not guaranteed as two sub-conventions may emerge concurrently and
remain stable. The existence of stable barriers that prevents the emergence of a single
convention is referred as frontier effect [75, 1]. Sparse SF networks such as this in
Figure 5 where minimum node degree is 1 might occasionally experience the frontier
effect and GSM is unable to resolve this problem. Therefore, in any undirected SF
network the GSM does not always guarantee the emergence of a single convention.
It is also noted that the analytical evidence in [19] to prove GSM’s effectiveness
in SF networks relies on a strong assumption of the homogeneity condition. This
assumption implies that the two conventions (X and Y) are uniformly distributed
among the neighbors of each agent. Although it is generally true for complete and
random networks, in sparse SF networks it does not hold because of the highly skewed
degree-distribution and very low connectivity (as illustrated in Figure 5). This means
the analysis of the mean-field equation in [19] does not guarantee convergence in sparse
SF networks or in general SF networks that suffer from the frontier effect.
To address the limitation of the GSM, a convention selection algorithm for SF net-
works that includes sparse SF topologies is presented in the next section. However,
this convention selection algorithm does not work as well in random networks as GSM
does (this observation is experimentally verified this in Subsection 3.1.4). Therefore,
in Subsection 3.1.3 a topology-aware convention selection algorithm (TACS) is pro-
posed that works across both SF and random networks.
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3.1.2.5 Accumulated Coupling Strength
In human society, people often prefer to join social cliques that is most beneficial
to them. By joining the clique they inherit the status that the members of the
clique maintain. The ACS convention selection algorithm is inspired by this social
phenomenon. We assume that agents might find it beneficial to adopt the conventions
of their socially influential neighbors. During initialization of the game, this social
influence of an agent is captured by its Coupling Strength (CS) that is represented by
its degree [76]. Therefore, initially agents with higher-degree have large CS and are
in a position to induce greater influence over their neighbors to adopt its convention.
Agents with lower CS value imitate their larger CS neighbors. When an agent adopts
the convention of its largest CS neighbor, its own CS gets accumulated (that we refer
as the Accumulated Coupling Strength or ACS) by adding the degree of all the agents
that belong to the same convention in that subnetwork. This enables every new agent
that adopts the convention of the subnetwork to inherit the social influence (with a
large value of ACS) of that subnetwork. However, this ideal ACS requires every node
to have global knowledge about the degree of every other node which is usually not
feasible in distributed networks. Hence a fully distributed and approximately efficient
variation of the ideal ACS is presented, as follows.
It requires that the CS of each agent gets accumulated by adding the degree of
the its neighbor node from which it has adopted the convention. In other words,
whenever a new node i adopts its neighbor j’s convention, its coupling strength gets
increased by the addition of the coupling strength of j with which it has coupled, i.e.,
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ACSi = CSi + CSj, where CSi <= CSj.
Therefore, even though initially only agents with large ACS could induce their
conventions to their comparatively low ACS neighbors, as the game proceeds their
coupling influence is propagated beyond their immediate neighborhood with the in-
crease of their neighbors’ ACS. This gradual accretion of the precedent builds up a
social pressure that makes the emergence of a single convention possible.
We now provide a theoretical justification on why the Accumulated Coupling
Strength (ACS) algorithm performs better in SF networks.
The ACS encodes the history of all previous influences and thereby acts as a so-
cial pressure to promote a specific convention. While a regular and homogeneous
distribution may allow many equally strong social pressures to exist and sustain, the
highly skewed degree-distribution of SF networks reduces the the chance of emerging
multiple social pressures and aids convergence into a single convention.
In SF networks there are few high-degree nodes that influence their low-degree
first-hop neighbors to adopt their conventions. As a consequence, the ACS values of
these first-hop neighbors would be larger than that of their source-of-influence high-
degree nodes. Therefore, these neighbors, with their accrued large ACS values, would
propagate their influence (their conventions) in their respective neighborhoods. Due
to the existing age-correlation among the high-degree nodes [8], a single convention
gets propagated over the entire network.
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Algorithm 1: Topology-Aware Convention Selection (TACS) Algorithm
input : Node n for which to select a convention, list L of topologies to consider
with corresponding degree probability distribution Pl∀l ∈ L, and a list
of corresponding convention selection algorithms Al∀l ∈ L that is
suitable for each topology
output: Selected convention C.
1.1 begin
1.2 Dn ← the list of degrees of the local neighborhood for Node n (including
node n itself).
1.3 for every topology type l ∈ L do
1.4 Sl ← 1
1.5 for every node degree d ∈ Dn do
1.6 Sl ← Sl × Pl(Dn(d))
1.7 end
1.8 end
1.9 l∗ ← argmaxlSl
1.10 C ← Al∗(n)
1.11 end
3.1.3 Topology-Aware Convention Selection Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows the Topology-Aware Convention Selection (TACS) algorithm.
The purpose of the TACS algorithm is to dynamically choose the most suitable con-
vention selection algorithm based on the network topology. Due to partial observabil-
ity, each individual agent is not aware of the overall network topology. The algorithm
is executed from an agents perspective and we assume that the entire population
simultaneously execute this algorithm. TACS first estimates the current network
topology based on the available local information and using the maximum likelihood
principle (Lines 1.2 - 1.9). Since the agents only use the degree-distribution informa-
tion of their immediate neighbors, we assume that the cost associated with memory
usage would be small and we ignore it. Then TACS selects a convention using the
best-suited Convention-Selection algorithm for the estimated topology (Line 1.10).
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The maximum likelihood principle works as follows. For the node under considera-
tion (that is choosing a convention), it computes the probability of having neighbor
with the current degrees under different topologies. Given that, identify the most
likely topology and choose a convention selection algorithm that is most suitable for
that particular topology.
We anticipate the possibility of making prediction error by the agents. However, the
idea of this approach is to maximize the probability of identifying the right topology
given the limited view an agent has. Increasing the agent view to more than one hop
will decrease the chance of error at the expense of more overhead (cost of memory
and processing would increase). Thus the agents are restricted to see the degree of
their single-hop neighbors.
This work focuses on two types of topologies (random and scale-free) but the pro-
posed algorithm can be extended to include other network types if needed. In what
follows we provide the techniques for the calculation of the degree-distribution prob-
abilities for both types of topologies.
Random Network: In random networks, the agent degrees are normally distributed
and in SF networks degrees follow power-law distribution. Computation of the normal
distribution function is trivial. For a given agent’s degree x, the normal distribution
is defined as following:
Prandom(x) =
1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
The parameter µ in this formula is the mean of the degree-distribution. The pa-
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rameter σ is its standard deviation; its variance is therefore σ2.
Scale-Free Network: In scale-free (SF) networks, the degree-distribution of the nodes
follow power-law form. The probability distribution for a quantity x that follows
power-law can be represented as
P (x) ∝ x−α
where α is a constant scaling parameter. Its value typically lies in the range of
2 < α < 3.
For distributions where the quantity of interest takes a discrete set of values (such
as in our case), the following probability function is used [15]:
Pscale−free(x) =
α− 1
xmin
(
x
xmin
)α
Typically power-law is applicable only for values greater than some minimum xmin.
Determination of xmin is a non-trivial task because all values of x may not follow the
power-law distribution. Since we generate the SF network in a controlled simulation
environment by using the BA model, our SF network nodes follow power-law degree
distribution starting from the minimum node degree to the maximum. Hence, the
value of xmin is set to be equal to the minimum node degree of the SF network.
In case of empirical data, there are standard estimation techniques for computing
x(min) [15].
The scaling parameter α is calculated using the method of maximum likelihood
(MLE) [15] which is a standard statistical approach for parameter estimation.
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α = 1 + n
[
n∑
i=1
ln
xi
xmin
]−1
3.1.4 Simulation and Results Analysis
We conduct extensive simulations with the following goals: (a) to investigate
whether the generalized simple majority (GSM) rule and the ACS algorithm con-
verge into large majority convention states on both random and SF networks and
then (b) to investigate how the proposed topology-aware convention selection algo-
rithm (TACS) performs on these networks.
3.1.4.1 Setup
The agents are situated in a connected topology that limits the communications
of each agent to their immediate neighbor set. An edge between two nodes of the
network indicates that the agents interact and play the coordination game. Two
types of networks of varying sizes are used: scale-free networks (SF) and random
(RN) networks.
SF topologies are generated using the BA model [8]5. Initially a small mesh network
consisting of three nodes is formed and then each new node is added according to
the preferential attachment rule of the BA model. We set the default minimum node
degree as 1 in both models (m = 1). As a consequence, each new node gets connected
to at most 1 existing node. Sparse SF topology (where minimum node-degree is 1) has
been chosen for implementation because this type of topology generally experiences
frontier effect [1] that the ACS algorithm tries to resolve.
5This model is described in Appendix A.
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The random (RN) networks are generated first by adding a random node to every
node in the network. This ensures that no node is isolated. Then edges are added
between two randomly selected nodes. The number of these randomly added edges
is double the network size.
The size of the RN and SF networks are varied starting from size 25 to 10000.
Initially one of the two conventions, X or Y, is randomly assigned to every node
in the network. Then the coordination game proceeds in rounds and each round
has two phases: (i) the agents play the game with all the neighbors based on their
current state of conventions and (ii) update the state based on the convention selection
algorithm6. Three convention selection algorithms are used: the Generalized Simple
Majority (GSM) [19] rule, Accumulated Coupling Strength (ACS) and Topology-
Aware Convention Selection (TACS) algorithm.
Since state updates depend on the local neighborhood, synchronous update is con-
sidered in which the entire society updates their states simultaneously in discrete
time-steps that gives rise to a discrete-time macro-level dynamics [69].
50 simulations are conducted by creating distinct instances of the networks. Each
simulation consists of 1000 time-steps where a time-step refers to a single run of the
program.
A converged single convention is considered as the one in which 90% or more agents
have adopted the same convention [31]. Two tailed t-tests are used to evaluate the
statistical difference of the performance of the action update rules.
6The convention selection algorithm refers to the action or state update rules in literature [19]
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3.1.4.2 Results
Comparison of GSM & ACS: Table 2 shows the performance of the GSM and the
ACS for various size RN and SF networks. For each network size and type we created
fifty network instances and used both the GSM and the ACS to observe the con-
vergence process. The results indicate that in RN networks, GSM successfully leads
the network to converge into a single convention. ACS performs extremely poorly
in RN networks as the network size increases. Applying a two tailed t-test on this
data shows that the difference in converging into a single convention between GSM
and ACS is significant with p-values < 0.05. The reason for the poor performance
of ACS in RN networks is following. Initially ACS enables nodes to cluster around
the higher degree nodes in their neighborhood. Unlike SF networks, there aren’t very
high-degree nodes or hubs in RN networks. As a consequence, many clusters are
formed. A cluster with comparatively very high ACS value could bias other clusters
to converge into it. However, in RN networks, none of the clusters would have very
high ACS value due to the absence of hub nodes. This results in poor performance
of ACS in RN networks.
On the other hand, in SF networks ACS performs better than GSM, as expected.
Only in the 25 agents SF network, GSM performs slightly better. But as the size of
the network increases, GSM fails to lead the network towards the a single convention.
The p-values (< 0.05) clearly indicate this performance difference between these two
approaches. The reason for the poor performance of GSM in SF networks is that it
fails to resolve frontier effect that we analytically explained in Subsection 3.1.2.4.
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Table 2: Performance comparison between GSM & ACS in random (RN) & scale-free
(SF) networks
Type Size GSM ACS t-test Values
25 50 44 t=2.532183794 p=0.014590637
100 50 20 t=8.034033595 p=1.69493E-10
500 49 1 t=17.7044527 p=3.939E-28
RN 1000 50 4 t=18.29325883 p=1.53687E-23
2000 50 2 t=20.19918638 p=2.08895E-25
5000 49 1 t=15.96306336 p=1.37358E-26
10000 49 1 t=18.95149434 p=1.64739E-31
25 18 37 t=-3.091860652 p=0.002610898
100 4 35 t=-10.39464223 p=1.88831E-17
500 0 33 t=-15.63800236 p=1.54961E-24
SF 1000 0 27 t=-13.9046204 p=7.265E-21
2000 0 34 t=-19.51279059 p=6.58889E-27
5000 0 31 t=-20.75669196 p=4.08026E-27
10000 0 27 t=-22.9619313 p=1.49407E-28
Performance of the TACS: Table 3 shows the performance of the TACS in comparison
with the performance of GSM and ACS for various size RN and SF networks. For each
network size and type, fifty network instances are generated and used TACS, GSM
and ACS. For RN networks, it can be noticed that TACS performs as well as GSM.
Overall the difference in the performance between TACS and GSM in RN networks is
not significantly different with p-value greater than 0.05. The exceptions are the 100,
1000 and 2000 node networks where the p-values are less than 0.05. However, even
in these networks both TACS and GSM always lead to a single convention. TACS
performs well in RN networks, because it enables agents to recognize the RN topology
and to use GSM. In contrast, the performance of ACS and TACS differs significantly
in these RN networks with p-values always less than 0.05.
In contrast, the performance of TACS in SF networks is reasonably good. Agents
are able to recognize the SF topology using TACS and correctly select ACS for con-
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Table 3: Performance of the TACS in random (RN) & scale-free (SF) networks
Type Size TACS /GSM t-test Values
25 50 /50 t=1 p=0.322223406
100 50 /50 t=4.149242849 p=0.000132341
500 49 /49 t=0.362917143 p=0.717481569
RN 1 x103 50 /50 t=12.35106344 p=1.1612E-16
2 x103 50 /50 t=17.07825128 p=2.84876E-22
5 x103 50 /49 t=-0.710770264 p=0.480596257
10 x103 50 /49 t=-0.689176472 p=0.493962921
25 34 /18 t=-3.262565143 p=0.001555407
100 31 /4 t=-9.6111065 p=8.45531E-16
500 27 /0 t=-19.64977344 p=9.59525E-34
SF 1 x103 16 /0 t=-14.57863053 p=6.73781E-23
2 x103 17 /0 t=-21.6798235 p=3.46767E-31
5 x103 17 /0 t=-23.47521492 p=1.15992E-30
10 x103 9 /0 t=-21.7111511 p=9.78724E-28
Type Size TACS /ACS t-test Values
25 50 /44 t=0.00825891 p=0.016517819
100 50 /20 t=-7.90979507 p=2.6252E-10
500 49 /1 t=-16.6143261 p=5.67608E-28
RN 1 x103 50 /4 t=-18.1241733 p=2.28718E-23
2 x103 50 /2 t=-20.03074525 p=3.01478E-25
5 x103 50 /1 t=-19.02586291 p=2.83241E-24
10 x103 50 /1 t=-22.66426789 p=1.26534E-27
25 34 /37 t=-0.056375585 p=0.955158569
100 31 /35 t=1.380074681 p=0.170736207
500 27 /33 t=0.789952988 p=0.431703075
SF 1 x103 16 /27 t=1.455369065 p=0.148898696
2 x103 17 /34 t=2.5304794 p=0.013128434
5 x103 17 /31 t=1.758085406 p=0.082023001
10 x103 9 /27 t=2.629977583 p=0.009931446
The (TACS/GSM) columns show the number of times each algorithm succeeded to converge
into a single convention (out of 50 simulations).
vention formation. The difference in the performance between TACS and ACS is not
significant for smaller networks (size less than 2000) with p-values greater than 0.05.
However, as the network size increases TACS appears to perform poorly as indicated
by its performance difference with that of ACS with p-values less than 0.05. We
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explain this phenomenon in the following.
Table 4: Topology identification by the agents in TACS
Size Type #GSM Followers #ACS Followers Type #GSM Followers #ACS Followers
25 24.9 0.1 1.56 23.44
100 99.24 0.76 4.6 95.4
500 496.3 3.7 22.4 477.6
1 x103 RN 991.7 8.3 SF 47.36 952.64
2 x103 1985.8 14.2 90.08 1909.92
5 x103 4962.14 37.86 229.26 4770.74
10 x103 9920.72 79.28 450.22 9549.78
For each network type and size columns 3-4 and 6-7 show the average number of the agents
that identified the topology as random (GSM followers) and as SF (ACS followers).
The number of times TACS is successful in leading the networks into a single
convention in SF networks is smaller compared to RN networks. This is due to the
comparatively smaller number of nodes in SF networks that correctly identify the
topology compared to the number of nodes that correctly identify the topology in
RN networks (see Table 4). This table shows the average number of agents that
identified the local topology as RN and adopted the GSM rule (these nodes are
denoted as the GSM followers); and the average number of agents that recognized the
local neighborhood structure as SF and adopted the ACS rule (the ACS followers).
We observe that when the network size becomes larger (≥ 2000) the difference in
numbers between the GSM followers (in RN networks) and the ACS followers (in SF
networks) becomes significantly larger. As a consequence more nodes in RN networks
use GSM than the nodes in SF networks that use ACS. This contributes to the
comparatively poor performance of the TACS in SF networks. The majority of the
agents in SF networks has smaller degree due to its power-law degree-distribution.
Since the agents only use their single-hop neighbors’ degree-distribution for computing
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the probability functions (both normal and power-law), for many agents it could
represent a normal degree-distribution. Hence, these agents incorrectly identify their
neighborhood topology as RN network use GSM instead of ACS resulting in poor
performance.
3.1.5 Conclusions
The goal of this work is to design a mechanism that allows a population of agents
to adapt towards forming a single convention in various types of complex networks. It
is based on the need that emergence of a social convention can reduce the overhead of
coordination in MAS. An evolutionary game theoretic approach is used here to solve
the convention problem. Our hypothesis is that no single distributed mechanism is
able to form convention across various topologies. Two types of MAS networks are
chosen for investigation that are scale-free (SF) and random (RN) networks. First,
we analytically show, and later experimentally substantiate, that the state-of-the-art
Generalized Simple Majority (GSM) action update rule does not perform successfully
across all different types of SF networks, particularly in sparse SF networks. Then
an accumulated coupling strength (ACS) convention selection algorithm is presented
that is able to create a single convention both in sparse and highly-connected SF
networks. ACS encodes the history of all previous influences and thereby acts as a
social pressure to promote a specific convention. However, ACS does not perform as
well in RN networks as GSM does. Hence, we propose a topology-aware convention
selection (TACS) algorithm that enables the agents to predict their local neighbor-
hood topology and then to select a suitable convention emergence algorithm. An
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extensive simulation study has been conducted on RN and SF networks. We show
that a large majority of the agents correctly recognize their topology and use either
GSM (for RN networks) or ACS (for SF networks) that leads to the convergence into
a single convention.
We have accomplished the research goals EC-SCS1-3 by:
• Showing theoretically and experimentally that the GSM mechanism fails to
converge in some SF networks and explain the flaw in the previous reported
theoretical analysis [19].
• Proposing a simple mechanism (ACS) for SF networks that is based on a so-
cially inspired technique. ACS only requires the agents’ knowledge about their
immediate local neighborhood and encodes all past interactions in the agents’
state to create a social pressure that expedites the convention convergence.
• Proposing a topology-aware meta mechanism (TACS) that recognizes the un-
derlying topology and select a suitable simple mechanism. Agents use their
single-hop neighbors’ degree-distribution to predict the global topology of the
network.
• Experimentally verifying the hypothesis that no simple distributed mechanism
are able to form convention across various topologies and that TACS performs
significantly better than any single mechanism.
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3.2 Topology-Aware Mechanism for Large Convention Space
3.2.1 Research Goals
Previously we discussed (in Chapter 2) two significant mechanisms by Salazar et
al. [56] and Franks et al. [23]7 that addressed the convention emergence problem
suitable for large convention space. We identified the following key limitations of
these two mechanisms: agent networks are assumed to be static and are unable to
form a Large Majority Convention State (henceforth referred as LMCS for short) in
which 90% or more agents adopt a single convention in a reasonable amount of time8.
In real-world applications, speeding up the convention formation process is a major
concern and challenge [40].
We propose a topology-aware convention formation mechanism for large conven-
tion space that is able to overcome the limitations of SRA and FGJ. To validate our
approach, similar to FGJ, we investigate a language coordination problem that cap-
tures the challenges involved in creating high-quality convention in large and dynamic
MAS. The topology-aware mechanism enables agents to use their social influence to
expedite the convention formation process.
In real-world applications the structure of agent society could be of different types.
Therefore, we consider a large number of agents in the MAS being organized as var-
ious types of networks that include regular, random (RN), Small-World (SW) and
Scale-Free (SF) networks. However, we emphasize scale-free topologies due to its
7Henceforth these two approaches are referred as SRA and FGJ respectively.
8Both in SRA and FGJ the time-period for investigating the emergence of lexicon convention
is comprised of 100,000 time-steps of the simulation. We use this duration as a definition of a
reasonable amount of time for convergence to occur.
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omnipresence in social and artificial systems. Every agent starts off with an internal
lexicon that consists of a set of concepts and randomly assigned word mappings. These
agents engage in repeated and pairwise interactions with their immediate neighbors.
Agents’ interactions are modeled using a language game in which they send lexicons
to their neighbors and update their lexicons based on the utility values of the received
lexicons. We propose a topology-aware utility computation mechanism that enables
the agents to use contextual knowledge to expedite the convention formation process.
According to this mechanism, if agents with the largest degree in their neighborhood
has a high quality lexicon, they would increase the utility of their lexicons in propor-
tion to their degree. As a consequence, these socially influential high-utility-lexicon
agents bias their neighbors to accept their lexicons. This phenomenon expedites the
convention formation process.
Moreover, to further augment this process, we use a socially-inspired technique
which is the power of diversity. In [50], it has been shown from a social science
perspective that diversity improves organizational productivity. It emphasizes that
not all diversity is helpful and that the benefits rest on conditions. Being inspired
by this approach, agents in our work are enabled to bring diversity in the population
through a novel network reorganization technique that is based on the lexicon utility.
According to this technique, an agent stochastically removes the smallest-lexicon-
utility-neighbor from its neighborhood and rewires with a randomly chosen neighbor
of the removed agent. This increases the chance of getting better-lexicon-utility-
neighbor in the neighborhood and thereby improves the quality of lexicons. We
show that the topology-aware mechanism along with the link diversity expedite the
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emergence of a stable and high-quality convention. In addition to this, we evaluate
the efficacy of the topology-aware mechanism by varying the topological features to
develop an understanding about how the topology influences convention formation
process. We also investigate the conditions under which diversity brings benefit. For
example, we implement both random reorganization and reorganization of links based
on the lexicon utility and see which facilitates language coordination more efficiently.
We set the following sub-goals concerning the problem of emergence of convention
in large convention space (EC-LCS) to achieve research goals RG4 - RG6 that we
outlined in Chapter 1(page 13):
• EC-LCS1: Design a topology-aware mechanism that is both (i) effective (able
to converge into LMCS as well as the quality of the most common convention
is high) and (ii) efficient (speed of reaching LMCS is fast).
• EC-LCS2: Model a dynamic network scenario that facilitates convention emer-
gence.
• EC-LCS3: Investigate how the average degree of the SF topologies influence
the convention formation process.
• EC-LCS4: Investigate various types of link diversity approaches in SF topologies
and their influence on convention formation .
3.2.2 Problem Formulation
A formal definition of the convention problem includes the following components:
(a) the interaction model that describes the interaction topology, (b) a language game
model that captures the agent interaction, (c) convention space defines the number of
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alternative conventions and (d) the information propagation model that specifies the
amount, type and direction of information exchange. A solution to this convention
problem is the one in which the MAS converges to LMCS in a reasonable amount of
time.
3.2.2.1 The Interaction Model
The agent interactions in the MAS are purely local and are constrained by an
undirected graph G(V,E) where V is the set of vertices (or nodes) and E ⊆ V x V
is the set of edges. Each node corresponds to an agent. The numbers of nodes are
referred by n. Two nodes vi and vj are neighbors if (vi, vj) ∈ E. The neighborhood
N(i) is the set of nodes adjacent to vi. That is, N(i) = {vj|(vi, vj)} ∈ E ⊂ V and
|N(i)| is the degree of node vi. The adjacent agents (within single-hop distance) are
defined as the neighbors. The network is dynamic in that the nodes change their
edges (social ties).
Four types of graphs are used for investigation: (1) regular network in the form of
ring topology, (2) Watts-Strogatz small-world network [79], (3) random network and
(4) Barabasi-Albert (BA) model of scale-free network [8].
3.2.2.2 The Language Game Model
Agent interactions are based on the FGJ language game model which is a variation
of Luc Steels original language game [67]. Steels designed a paradigm that enables
artificial agents to play language games about situations they perceive and act upon
in the real world; and self-organize communication systems from scratch. Initially
the agents start off with randomized internal lexicons. Each lexicon has a set of
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mappings from concepts (C) to words (W). Because of the random allocation of
the concept-word mapping, some concepts may have more than one word. In other
words, synonymy may exist in the lexicon. The game is initialized with multiple
convention alternatives or convention seeds (as defined previously). Agents spread
their convention seeds through repeated interactions. We assume that agents are
rational and hence accept conventions with high utility values. Agents adopt and
adapt high-quality convention and keep on creating better convention seeds. Finally,
one high-quality seed emerges as the dominant convention in the network. A high-
quality lexicon is the one that has reduced or zero synonymy.
3.2.2.3 Convention Space
The number of concepts and words are assumed to be equal (|C| = |W |). Therefore,
the size of the convention space is bounded by (|W ||C|). Similar to FGJ, 10 fixed
concepts for 10 words are used; hence the possible size of the convention space is
quite large (1010).
3.2.2.4 Information Propagation Model
We use spreading-based mechanism for information propagation model because
of its appealing speed of reaching a convention [19, 53]. In these spreading-based
approaches, agents propagate some characteristics (conventions) over the members
of the society to influence them to adopt it. Agents have access to the state of the
current conventions (utility of the lexicons) of their neighbors. Neighbors provide
this information when an agent makes such request. The communication channel
is assumed to be error-free. Since the agent communication is limited only within
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their local neighborhood, the cost associated with their communication is ignored.
Moreover, the information propagation is bidirectional. Even if the edge from agent
A to B is removed, the edge from B to A remains.
3.2.3 Topology-Aware Convention Formation Mechanism
In each round of the language game, agents perform the following four tasks: (i)
communication, (ii) lexicon spreading, (iii) lexicon update, and (iv) Network Reor-
ganization. The first three steps are based on FGJ. The lexicon update model is
implemented as an asynchronous process in which agents spread and update their
lexicons probabilistically.
(i) Communication: Every agent chooses a random neighbor and sends one word
mapping for a randomly selected concept. The communication is successful if the
receiving agent uses the same mapping. The sending agent i computes its commu-
nicative efficacy (CEi) as the proportion of successful communications (succComm)
over the last 20 time-steps: CEi = #succComm/20.
(ii) Lexicon Spreading: An agent sends its partial lexicon to its neighbors with a
sending probability psend. Every agent has a fixed lexicon transfer length. It sends
a contiguous set of mappings from its lexicon equal to this transfer length starting
from a randomly selected mapping. A receiving agent that updates its lexicon using
this mappings start from the same random point.
(iii) Lexicon Update: Each agent compares the utility of all the received mappings
and choose the mapping with the largest utility. An agent updates its lexicon from
the received mappings from its neighbors with an update probability pupdate.
60
Utility Computation Mechanism: In FGJ, an agent computes its lexicon utility by
adding its communicative efficacy with its lexicon specificity. Agents calculate lexicon
specificity of a single concept (Sc) in a lexicon using the formula Sc =
1
|Wc| where Wc
is the set of words associated with that concept. The specificity of a lexicon is the
average of the specificity of all concepts:
S =
∑
c∈C
Sc/|C| (1)
The approach taken here augments the computation of lexicon utility by adding
a topological factor. Therefore, an agent i computes the utility of its lexicon (ui)
by summing up its communicative efficacy (CEi), lexicon specificity (Si) and a the
topological factor (TFi) as follows:
ui = aCEi + bSi + cTFi (2)
where a, b and c are constants to adjust weights of these three parameters. The
topological factor is introduced to expedite the convention formation process. Agents
with the largest degrees (higher social status) in their neighborhood and better quality
lexicons (high-quality seeds) are enabled to acquire large values for their topological
parameter which increases their lexicon utility. As a consequence these high-degree
nodes are able to influence a large number of agents to adopt their conventions quickly.
Our hypothesis is that within a local neighborhood, some agents would have larger con-
nections (higher influence capability) and these agents could be empowered to strongly
influence their neighbors to adopt the better quality lexicons that they have. This would
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significantly enhance the speed of convention formation and improve the quality of
the dominant lexicon.
Algorithm 2: Topological Factor Computation
2.1 for each agent i:= 1 to n do
2.2 if LargestDegreeinNeighborhood(i) AND LexiconSpecificity(i) ≥ α then
2.3 TopologicalFactor(i) = Degree(i)
2.4 end
2.5 if LexiconSpecificity(i) ≥ λ then
2.6 TopologicalFactor(i) = µ
2.7 end
2.8 end
Algorithm 2 describes the computation of the topological factor. Agents with the
largest degree in their neighborhood and with lexicon specificity greater than or equal
to a threshold value (α) set their topological factor to be the value of their degree
(Lines 2.2 - 2.3). It increases the lexicon utility of these largest degree agents and
thus these agents expedite the convention formation process. However, it is possible
that initially the largest degree agents may not have lexicons with high specificity.
Therefore, in order to facilitate these agents to adapt high-quality lexicons, any agent
with lexicon specificity equal to or above a threshold value (λ) is enabled to set its
topological factor as equal to a very large number (µ) as in lines 2.5 - 2.6. These
agents then influence their neighbors, including the larger-degree agents, to adapt
the high-quality lexicon mappings in fewer time-steps. Once a larger degree agent
acquires high-quality lexicon, it begins to influence its larger neighbor base as in lines
2.2 - 2.3.
(iv) Increased Diversity through Network Reorganization: Individual agents are ca-
pable of making rational choices to remove and rewire a link; and thereby increase
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the diversity in their neighborhood. Our assumption is that by removing the lowest-
lexicon-utility neighbors and then by rewiring to randomly chosen neighbors beyond
their neighborhood, agents can improve the chance of increasing their lexicon speci-
ficity by having neighbors with potentially better quality lexicons. In other words,
this link diversity contributes to the creation of better convention seeds that results
in facilitating high-quality convention formation. With a given probability, an agent
removes an existing link with a neighbor with the lowest lexicon utility. However,
it will do so only if its own lexicon utility is larger than its lowest-lexicon-utility
neighbor. This is to ensure that agents will not remove neighbors (including the
lowest-lexicon-utility neighbor) that happen to have better lexicons than the agent.
It then rewires with a randomly chosen neighbor of its removed neighbor. This way
the diversity in the network is conditioned. Only a small number of agents would take
part in network reorganization based on the assumption that the entire society may
not get involved in reorganization. Another assumption is that only one neighbor
would be removed to add a new neighbor. This way the total number of links can be
maintained at a constant level and the degree-distribution of the nodes would remain
unchanged.
Figure 6 shows how this reorganization works. At time t1, agent A has two neigh-
bors B and C. The lexicon utility of agent B is the lowest in A’s neighborhood.
Moreover, B’s lexicon utility is smaller than that of A. Therefore, agent A stochasti-
cally removes its link with B and rewire with a randomly chosen neighbor of B (that
could be D or E). Since the network is bi-directional, removing a link from agent A
to B does not remove the link from B to A. At time t2, agent A removes its link
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A
C
B
D
E
u(C) > u(B) & u(A) > u (B)
(a) t1
A
C
B
D
E
u(C) > u(B) & u(A) > u (B)
(b) t2
Figure 6: Network reorganization (t1 < t2).
with B and rewire with one of B’s neighbor with a probability given by the Fermi
function [48] p = [1 + e−β(uA−uB)]−1. The parameter β controls the intensity of se-
lection in that for larger values of it (β → ∞) the edges of the lowest-lexicon-utility
agents are deterministically removed and rewires to a randomly selected neighbor of
the removed agent. It is assumed that only a small fraction of randomly selected
agents take part in this network reorganization process.
3.2.3.1 Algorithm for Convention Formation Mechanism
Algorithm 3 describes the distributed convention formation mechanism. This algo-
rithm is executed by each individual agent in the network. Initially mappings for the
lexicons are randomly assigned among the agents. Then each agent sends one ran-
dom mapping to a randomly chosen neighbor and computes communicative efficacy,
lexicon specificity (Lines 3.2 - 3.5), topological factor and lexicon utilities (Lines 3.6
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Algorithm 3: Topologically-Aware Algorithm
3.1 for each agent i:= 1 to n do
3.2 randomLexiconAssignment()
3.3 sendOneMappingToRandomNeighbor()
3.4 computeCommunicativeEfficacy(#succComm/20)
3.5 computeLexiconSpecificity(Equation 1)
3.6 computeTopologicalFactor(Algorithm 2)
3.7 computeLexiconUtility(Equation 2)
3.8 probabilisticLexiconSpreadingtoNeighbors()
3.9 probabilisticLexiconUpdate()
3.10 networkReorganization()
3.11 end
3.12 iterate (Lines 3.1 - 3.10)
- 3.7). They then probabilistically spread their partial lexicons and update their lex-
icons (Lines 3.8 - 3.10). This process repeats (Lines 3.1 - 3.10) over multiple rounds
and a majority lexicon convention emerges.
3.2.4 Simulation and Results Analysis
We conduct simulations with the following goals: (i) compare the performance
of two state-of-the-art lexicon convention formation mechanisms with the topology-
aware (TA) mechanism on various types of networks including regular (ring), small-
world (SW), random (RN) and scale-free (SF) networks, (ii) investigate how the
TA mechanism performs across various degree SF networks and (iii) understand the
amount of network reorganization required for emerging and sustaining convention
across various topologies.
The dominant lexicon convention is defined as the one that is shared by the largest
number of agents.
The following metrics are used for comparison:
• Effectiveness: A mechanism is defined to be effective if it is able to converge into a
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LMCS within a reasonable amount of time.
• Efficiency: This parameter measures how fast a network converges into a LMCS.
• Dominant Lexicon Specificity (DLS): It represents the lexicon specificity that belongs
to the dominant convention. DLS helps to understand how lexicon specificity of the
dominant convention evolves (improves) over time.
• Average Communicative Efficacy (ACE): It provides a measure of the average com-
municative efficacy of the system. ACE is used to understand the level of coordination
of the system at each time-step.
• Average Network Reorganization: It provides a measure of the number of network
reorganization, that includes link removal and rewiring, on average at each time-step.
It helps to understand the required level of diversity for stable convention emergence.
3.2.4.1 Simulation Setup
We conduct experiments on four topologies: ring, SW, RN and SF.
We use Watts and Strogatz model to create small-world networks [79]. The rewiring
probability is set to 0.1 (similar to SRA and FGJ). SF topologies are generated using
the BA model [8]9.
Each type of network consists of 1000 agents represented as nodes in the network.
An edge between two nodes of the network indicates that the agents can interact and
play the language game. The average node degree in these networks are set to 20 for
the purpose of comparison with the two baseline state-of-the-art approaches. Later
average node degree is varied on SF topologies to see its effect on the performance.
Similar to FGJ, initially the internal lexicon of every agent is set with 10 fixed
9This model is described in Appendix A.
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concepts and a randomized mapping of one or more words (from a set of 10 words)
for each concept. The simulation proceeds according to Algorithm 3. For the compu-
tation of the lexicon utility, as in FGJ, the three weight constants are assumed to be
equal to 1 (a = b = c = 1). The spreading and updating probabilities are set to 0.01.
Only 10% of the agents are randomly selected to take part in network reorganization
using the Fermi function in which the value of β is set to 1.0.
Table 5 provides the setting of the threshold levels of the parameters for the TA
mechanism. α is set to be greater than or equal to 0.95 and λ is equal to 1.0. It
enables the largest degree agents in any neighborhood to exert influence (by increasing
their topological factor) only when their lexicon specificity is equal to or above 0.95.
However, any agent (including the smaller degree agents) can increase its topological
factor when its lexicon specificity is maximum. For the calculation of the topological
factor, µ is set to a large number 1000.
For implementing FGJ mechanism, 50 influencer agents are randomly deployed in
the network, as in the original FGJ. These agents start off with a unique lexicon in
which every concept has a single word mapping (lexicon specificity is optimum, i.e.,
equal to 1.0).
All the results reported are averages over 50 realizations for each network. Each
simulation consists of 100,000 time-steps where a time-step refers to a single run of
the program.
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Table 5: Parameter Values for Simulation Configuration.
α λ psend pupdate
TA ≥ 0.95 = 1.0 0.01 0.01
SRA N/A N/A 0.01 0.01
FGJ N/A N/A 0.01 0.01
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(d) Scale-Free
Figure 7: Comparison of the number of dominant lexicon agents for the topology-
aware (TA) approach with SRA and FGJ’s approach.
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3.2.4.2 Simulation Results
Convergence to LMCS & Speed of Convention Formation: Figure 7 shows how dom-
inant convention agents evolve over time for TA, SRA and FGJ over Ring, SW, RN
and SF topologies respectively. We observe that TA clearly outperforms the two
state-of-the-art approaches in all four network types. A combination of the topology-
aware lexicon-utility computation and link diversity enables 90% agents to converge
into a single convention much faster than SRA and FGJ over these topologies.
Table 6: Performance Comparison: %ACC refers to % of agents converged into a
convention at timestep t. ACE & DLS are reported at 100,000 time-step.
Ring Small-World
%ACC t ACE DLS %ACC t ACE DLS
TA 80 18757 0.94 0.88 80 1837 0.94 0.87
90 29323 0.96 0.88 90 30222 0.97 0.88
SRA 80 X 80 X
90 X 90 X
FGJ 80 X 80 X
90 X 90 X
Random Scale-Free
%ACC t ACE DLS %ACC t ACE DLS
TA 80 27549 0.94 0.89 80 24375 0.94 0.94
90 47595 0.97 0.90 90 68111 0.97 0.95
SRA 80 X 80 70660 0.96 0.98
90 X 90 X
FGJ 80 43961 0.92 1.0 80 35500 0.96 1.0
90 X 90 X
SRA and FGJ fail to converge into LMCS in RN and SF networks. Table 6 shows
that SRA requires as many as 70,660 rounds to make 80% agents use the dominant
lexicon in SF networks which it fails to do in RN topologies within 100,000 time-
steps. On the other hand, TA requires 24,375 time-steps to have 80% agents to use
a common lexicon in SF networks and 27549 time-steps in RN networks. We observe
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similar poor performance in case of FGJ that requires 35,500 time-steps to have 80%
agents to use a common lexicon in SF networks and 4396 time-steps in RN networks.
The performance of SRA and FGJ is worse in Ring and SW topologies. SRA enables
less than 25 agents to form a single convention over these two topologies; and using
FGJ less than 250 agents converge into a single convention within 100,000 time-steps.
Both in Ring and SW networks, degree-heterogeneity is much less compared to RN
and SF networks. As a consequence the spreading based approaches of SRA and FGJ
require longer time for the convergence into a LMCS. However, TA mechanism enables
agents to use their social influence to bias their neighbors to adopt conventions at a
faster rate. Moreover, according to TA, if an agent has perfect lexicon, it increases
the utility of its lexicon to strongly influence their neighbors. In addition to this,
link diversity through network reorganization increases the chance of having better-
lexicon-quality-neighbors. That’s why spreading of high quality lexicon occurs faster
in TA mechanism.
Average Communicative Efficacy (ACE) & Dominant Lexicon Specificity (DLS): Fig-
ures 8, 9, 10 and 11 show how ACE and DLS values change over time in four topologies
for TA, SRA and FGJ.
In Ring networks, the ACE is significantly better in case of TA than SRA and FGJ
(see Figure 8(a)). It indicates the level of coordination is high when agents use TA
mechanism in Ring networks. We discussed previously that the TA empowers the
agents with perfect lexicons to expedite the convention formation process. Also link
diversity helps to improve the chance of creating better lexicons. However, the DLS
in FGJ is better than TA. The reason is that FGJ has the advantage of initializing
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Figure 8: Comparison of the evolution of average communicative efficacy (ACE) &
dominant lexicon specificity (DLS) in Ring networks. The values are averaged over
50 separate instances of simulation.
a fraction of the agents with the optimum quality lexicon that bias the rest of the
network to adopt their lexicon.
We observe similar behavior of TA in SW networks. Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show
that the ACE is significantly better in case of TA than SRA and FGJ. However, the
DLS is not as good in TA as it is in FGJ.
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show that, in RN networks, ACE is larger in TA than SRA
and FGJ. The level of coordination for FGJ is better in RN networks than it is in
SW networks, as can be seen from Figure 10(a). DLS for TA is not better than SRA
and FGJ. In other words, although TA converges into LMCS (SRA and FGJ fail to
do so), its DLS is only as high as 0.90 (Table 6).
We follow similar behavior of ACE and DLS for TA in SF networks. Figures 11(a)
and 11(b) indicate that while ACE is the largest using TA, DLS of TA is slightly
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Figure 9: Comparison of the evolution of average communicative efficacy (ACE) &
dominant lexicon specificity (DLS) in Small-World networks. The values are averaged
over 50 separate instances of simulation.
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Figure 10: Comparison of the evolution of average communicative efficacy (ACE) &
dominant lexicon specificity (DLS) in Random networks. The values are averaged
over 50 separate instances of simulation.
72
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●●●
●●●●●
●●●●●●●●●●●
●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●●●
●●
●
●●
●●
●●●●
●●●●●●●●●●●
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t − Timesteps
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
iv
e 
E
ffi
ca
cy
 (
A
C
E
)
● TA
SRA
FGJ
(a) Scale-Free: ACE
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●●
●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t − Timesteps
D
om
in
an
t L
ex
ic
on
 S
pe
ci
fic
ity
 (
D
LS
)
● TA
SRA
FGJ
(b) Scale-Free: DLS
Figure 11: Comparison of the evolution of average communicative efficacy (ACE) &
dominant lexicon specificity (DLS) in Scale-Free networks. The values are averaged
over 50 separate instances of simulation.
less than SRA and FGJ (Table 6). In other words, TA performs significantly better
in SF topologies compared to other networks with respect to fast and guaranteed
convergence to LMCS, and with respect to maintaining a large level of ACE and
DLS.
Performance of TA Across Various Degree SF Networks: We try to understand the
performance of TA across various degree SF networks. Figure 12 shows how dominant
convention agents evolve over various degree SF topologies. We notice that MAS
converges into LMCS only when the average node degree is 20 or above. SF networks
with smaller average degree fail to create LMCS within 100,000 time-steps. As the
network becomes more and more sparse, convention formation becomes slower. For
example, in networks with average degree of 2, evolution of convention formation
occurs very slowly. Smaller neighborhood slows down convention formation process
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because smaller average degree restrains information propagation. Moreover, the link
diversity cannot reap much benefit due to slow improvement of the lexicon specificity.
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Figure 12: Comparison of the number of dominant lexicon agents for various average
degree SF networks for the topology-aware (TA) approach.
Previous approaches (SRA and FGJ) claim to solve language convention problem
in SF networks, however their investigation is only on networks with average degree
20. In other words, their results on SF networks are based on dense topologies and
do not cover the range of all possible SF topologies. This dissertation points to the
challenge of establishing fast convention in sparser SF networks.
Average Network Reorganization: Figure 13 shows the amount of average network
reorganization that occurs in four topologies when agents use the TA mechanism.
Although initially a lot of reorganization activities can be observed, as the MAS
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evolves towards converging into a dominant convention, the amount of reorganiza-
tion decreases across all topologies. According to TA, agents stop reorganizing their
network if the quality of their neighbors lexicons are better. We notice a sharp
downward transition in SF networks which occurs faster, within 20,000 time-steps.
Moreover, the average reorganization comes down to as small a value as 5 after the
system converges into 80% convention state. It indicates that SF topologies require
comparatively a smaller number of network reorganization to form convention.
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Figure 13: Average network reorganization in the topology-aware (TA) approach
across four topologies.
In SF networks few hub nodes are connected to a large majority of the nodes.
As a consequence, hubs are able to interact with a diverse set of nodes. In other
words, due to the structure of the SF networks, hubs experience link diversity without
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explicit network reorganization. That’s why it requires only a low level of network
reorganization to form faster and high-quality convention.
Reorganization decreases in SW and Ring topologies as well, although TA requires
more reorganization in these topologies. Of the four, RN networks seem to be unruly
and experience more reorganization activities for forming and sustaining a dominant
convention. For example, unlike SF topologies, the decrease in the amount of reorga-
nization in RN networks is not sharp and even after it converges into 90% convention
state the amount of reorganization remains close to a comparatively large value of 15.
Effect of Various Types of Link Diversity Techniques: In order to investigate the
effect of link diversity over the process of convention formation in SF topologies, we
perform a comparative investigation between the proposed link diversity technique
and two of its variants. The proposed technique, that is based on Limited Reorgani-
zation, requires an agent to compare its lexicon utility with its lowest-lexicon-utility
neighbor and if the agent’s lexicon quality is better than that of the lowest-lexicon-
utility neighbor then this triggers a stochastic reorganization. One variant of this
technique, called “Full Reorganization”, requires the agents to stochastically remove
the lowest-lexicon-utility neighbor irrespective of the value of its own lexicon utility
and subsequently rewire. Another variant, called “Random Reorganization”, enables
an agent to randomly choose a neighbor for reorganization. Figure 14(a) shows that
although Full Reorganization mechanism is faster than Limited Reorganization, both
mechanisms converge into LMCS. Random reorganization technique appears to be
slower. The amount of network reorganization in Full Reorganization and Random
Reorganization are significantly higher as can be seen in Figure 14(b). Agents, when
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(a) Comparison of the Evolution of Dominant
Lexicon Agents
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●●●
t − Timesteps
A
ve
ra
ge
 N
et
w
or
k 
R
eo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
●
●
TA−Full Reorganization
TA−Limited Reorganization
TA−Random Reorganization
(b) Comparison of the Average Network Reor-
ganization
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(c) Comparison of Average Communicative Ef-
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(d) Comparison of Dominant Lexicon Speci-
ficity (DLS)
Figure 14: Comparison of the evolution of dominant lexicon agents, average network
reorganization, average communicative efficacy and dominant lexicon specificity in
Scale-Free networks among TA mechanism with full, limited and random network
reorganization. The values are averaged over 50 separate instances of simulation.
using this two techniques, continuously reorganize their neighborhood even after the
system converges into LMCS. This suggests that in situations where network reor-
ganization is expensive, the Limited Reorganization approach pays off more. It also
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suggests that when a system experiences continuous reorganization (in highly dynamic
scenario), Random Reorganization technique is able to create and sustain convention.
Figure 14(c) shows that the average communicative efficacy in Random Reorga-
nization increases slowly. Moreover, the dominant lexicon specificity in Random
Reorganization is much smaller than the other two being less than 0.8 (see Figure
14(d)). Therefore, we observe that although Random Reorganization technique en-
ables agents to create a LMCS, the quality of the dominant lexicon is not good.
The reason is that Random Reorganization process does not ensure the removal of
lowest-lexicon-utility agents and does not increase the chance of having agents with
better quality agents. It could remove agents with better quality lexicon as well. As
a consequence, this “unconditional” reorganization technique does not enhance the
convention formation process.
In contrast, the “conditional” reorganization in both Full and Limited Reorgani-
zation techniques improves both the effectiveness and efficiency of the convention
process. According to these two techniques, agents are enabled to remove the lowest-
lexicon-utility agents and could potentially bring agents with better lexicons in the
neighborhood. This enhances the process of creating high quality lexicon convention.
Therefore, we observe that conditioned link diversity facilitates better convention
formation.
3.2.4.3 Discussion
TA mechanism is clearly better than SRA and FGJ as it enables MAS to converge
into LMCS faster (within 100,000 time-steps) when the MAS is organized as RN and
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SF networks. It is also able to create 80% agent convention state in Ring and SW
networks within this time bound.
The DLS of FGJ is the largest because the influencer agents initialize their lexicon
with the optimum specificity value and therefore are able to enforce their influence.
This mechanism starts off with a best quality convention seed (perfect lexicon) carried
by the influencer agents and hence does not require to improve this seed (or invent a
new one). The speed of convention formation in FGJ is faster than SRA because of
the existence of these influencer agents. However, FGJ does not provide cost estimate
for deploying and maintaining these privileged agents.
Implementing dynamic network is a challenging task as it involves domain-specific
knowledge and assumptions. In our work, we implement dynamic network topology
through link diversity. The network reorganization approach is a result of a simple
and realistic intuition that agents are more likely to disassociate with a neighbor that
is not beneficial and would like to make acquaintance with better quality neighbors.
However, this apparently simple intuition is difficult to implement because, again, it
requires domain-specific assumptions, such as, how many neighbors should an agent
remove from its neighborhood if they have poor quality lexicons? How many new
connections this agent is supposed to create afterwards? Should the entire society
engage into this type of network reorganization or only a fraction of the society would
do so?
To keep the analysis simple and for the sake of a focused investigation, we adopt a
conditioned link diversity mechanism that is based on a simple network reorganization
approach. We intentionally choose a small value for this fraction (10%) based on the
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assumption that the entire society may not get involved in reorganization. The results
from the investigation on two variants of reorganization approach indicate that link
diversity via network reorganization facilitates faster convention formation.
3.2.5 Conclusions
The goal of this research is to design a mechanism that is able to create a social
convention within a large convention space for MAS operating on various types of
dynamic networks. We hypothesize that if agents are endowed with the capability
of “network thinking” and are enabled to use contextual knowledge for decision-
making, the convention formation process becomes faster and efficient. To validate
this hypothesis, we use a language coordination problem from FGJ for investiga-
tion. According to this problem, a society of agents construct a common lexicon in a
decentralized fashion. Similar to FGJ, agents’ interactions are modeled using a lan-
guage game. In this game, agents send their lexicons to their neighbors and update
their lexicon based on the utility values of the received lexicons. We propose a novel
topology-aware utility computation mechanism that enables the agents to reorganize
their neighborhood based on this utility estimate to expedite the convention forma-
tion process. Extensive simulation results indicate that the proposed mechanism is
both effective (able to converge into a large majority convention state with more than
90% agents sharing a high-quality lexicon) and efficient (faster) as compared to SRA
and FGJ.
We have accomplished the research goals EC-LCS1-4 by:
• Enabling the agents to use “network thinking” for controlling the dynamical pro-
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cess of convention formation suitable for a large convention space across various
types of networks. This topology-aware mechanism facilitates the formation
of a large majority convention much faster than the existing state-of-the-art
approaches and ensures high-quality of the convention.
• Modeling dynamic topologies through a novel network reorganization technique.
• Analyzing the correlation between the degree-distribution and the convention
formation process in SF topologies. Identifying the challenge of establishing
convention in sparser SF topologies that slow down the process of convention
formation.
• Investigating various types of link diversity approaches and how these influence
convention formation in SF topologies. For example, the proposed conditioned
link diversity improves the quality of lexicon than random link diversity ap-
proach.
CHAPTER 4: EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION
This chapter presents two mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation in mod-
erate and highly-connected networks. The existing mechanisms are able to form
cooperation in scale-free networks when the networks are sparsely connected (aver-
age node degree is small) that too only with limited success [29]. Moderate and
highly-connected scale-free networks remain mostly unexplored domains for cooper-
ation emergence.
The first mechanism (discussed in Subsection 4.1) uses commitment based dynamic
coalition formation technique and complex network dynamics to form cooperation.
Agents in the MAS are organized as scale-free networks and the proposed mechanism
is able to form cooperation in moderately-connected scale-free networks (where average
node degree is 20). The second mechanism (discussed in Subsection 4.2) considers
highly-connected scale-free networks (where average node degree is up to 50) and
uses a heterogeneous system design that includes a small fraction of altruistic agents.
Highly-connected networks have been shown to be susceptible to defection and are
the most challenging to sustain cooperation [29, 47]. We show that the altruistic
agent based approach ensures cooperation in such networks.
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4.1 Emergence of Cooperation using Commitment Based Dynamic Coalition
Formation and Complex Networks Dynamics
Our aim here is to facilitate the emergence of cooperation in large MAS operating
on scale-free (SF) networks where such cooperation helps maximize the global utility
of the MAS. Agents organized as SF networks have moderate connectivity and play an
iterated PD game with their immediate neighbors. We propose a commitment-based
dynamic coalition formation approach that leverages complex network dynamics.
Dynamic Coalition Formation: Coalition formation provides a mechanism for pro-
moting cooperation in complex networks [51, 55]. A coalition is defined as a group
of agents who have decided to cooperate in order to perform a common task. By
increasing the organizational level through coalitions, cooperation can be enhanced
and maintained. The primary contribution in this research is a dynamic coalition for-
mation approach that is based on commitment between agents. A commitment is a
promise that an agent offers to another agent in order to influence that agent’s strat-
egy. An agent makes use of commitments to exploit the strength of its own strategic
position [26]. It has been shown in [4] that commitments can be used to foster cooper-
ation among self-interested agents in non-iterated PD game. Typically a commitment
proposal includes a penalty to ensure that the breach of commitment would result in
incurring a cost [4]. Self-interested and rational agents are enabled to offer commit-
ments to their wealthy neighbors with whom they intend to form coalitions. Agents
that offer commitments bear the cost of maintaining the coalition and promise to pay
a penalty should they decide to leave the coalition. The penalty threshold is set such
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that it provides sufficient incentive to an otherwise non-cooperative neighbor agent
to join the coalition and thereby cooperate. An agent moves into a different coalition
with better social benefit if it is capable of paying the penalty.
Complex Network Dynamics: The secondary contribution in this work is that it in-
vestigates the effect of the complex network dynamics over the commitment-based
dynamic coalition formation approach. It has been shown previously that although
defection is the dominant strategy in the iterated PD game [29], the likelihood of
cooperation is remarkably increased if the agent interaction is constrained by the un-
derlying network topology [57, 71]. However, in these approaches, agents neither form
the network nor use the network dynamics to enhance the emergence phenomenon.
These works assume a pre-established static complex network platform and then
employ agents on the nodes of the network for mutual interactions. In this work, in-
stead of assuming a given network, agents are enabled to form the desired network by
choosing their interaction partners. It determines the topological insights that, when
embedded into agent partner selection strategy, result in a network always leading
towards the emergence of a stable single coalition.
To summarize, we emphasize the significance of employing “network thinking” by
the agents to control their dynamics and the dynamical processes of the network.
This work advances the state of the art by (i) developing a commitment-based dy-
namic coalition formation approach with an analytical study about how an effective
commitment mechanism is related to the topology of the network and (ii) by deter-
mining the topological insights for the agents to choose their interaction partners to
form a dynamically growing SF network that enhances the overall cooperation with
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maximized average expected utility.
4.1.1 Research Goals
We address the following sub-goals for the emergence of cooperation using the
dynamic coalition formation (EC-DCF) approach to achieve research goals RG7 and
RG8 that we outlined in Chapter 1(page 14):
• EC-DCF1: In a networked interaction scenario, the challenge is to determine a
penalty that facilitates the convergence into a single coalition and at the same
time is high enough to incentivize the opponents to form coalitions. Our goal is
to show both analytically and empirically how the penalty could be set based
on the minimum number of immediate neighbors or minimum node degree of
the SF network and the payoffs; and provide a sufficient condition that requires
to be fulfilled in order for optimal coalitions to emerge.
• EC-DCF2: In order to gain the topological insights for network formation, our
goal is to develop a computational model that investigates the performance
of the dynamic coalition formation algorithm on various types of SF networks
by varying the minimum node-degree, degree-heterogeneity and clustering co-
efficient. Specifically, we intend to investigate how a dynamical process of a
network, namely the coalition formation, is influenced by its structural proper-
ties.
4.1.2 Problem Model
The agent interactions in the MAS are specified by an undirected graph G(V,E)
where V is the set of vertices (or nodes) and E ⊆ V x V is the set of edges. Each
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node corresponds to an agent. The numbers of nodes are referred by n. Once the
graph or the network is formed by the agents it becomes fixed. Two nodes vi and vj
are neighbors if (vi, vj) ∈ E. The neighborhood N(i) is the set of nodes adjacent to
vi. That is, N(i) = {vj|(vi, vj)} ∈ E ⊂ V and |N(i)| is the degree of node vi.
The graph follows scale-free property in which the distribution of node degree
follows a power-law, Nd ∝ d−γ, where Nd is the number of nodes of degree d and γ is
a constant.
The proposed decentralized coalition formation approach requires the agents to
communicate only with their immediate neighborhood to form coalitions. We assume
that agents are self-interested and rational. To initialize, agents are enabled to form
the network by choosing their interaction partners dynamically. The adjacent agents
(within single-hop distance) are defined as the neighbors. Every agent is equipped to
play a 2-person iterated PD game with each one of its neighbors and their interactions
are represented by the network links. The agents start playing the PD game after the
network is formed and the final network is considered as a closed system.
Agent i’s payoff is denoted by u(i, j) which agent i obtains by playing a PD game
with its neighbor j. After every round of the game, the payoff received by playing the
PD game with the neighbors gets accumulated and the accumulated payoff is defined
as
∑m
j=1 u(i, j), where j refers to the neighbors of i. Agents know the accumulated
payoff of their neighbors. Every agent has a fixed strategy for each one of its neighbors,
which is either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). In a 2-person PD game setting these
two strategies intersect at four possible outcomes represented by designated payoffs:
R (reward) and P (punishment) are the payoffs for mutual cooperation and defection,
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respectively, whereas S (sucker) and T (temptation) are the payoffs for cooperation
by one player and defection by the other. The payoff matrix is represented by Table 7.
For the PD game, the payoffs satisfy the condition T > R > P > S and for iterated
PD’s we require T + S < 2R.
Table 7: Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
The iterated PD game proceeds in rounds and each round has three phases: (i)
the agents play the game with all the neighbors using fixed strategies and compute
the accumulated payoff, (ii) based on the payoff information of the neighborhood,
the agents form/join coalition and (iii) update the strategies used in the coalition
formation algorithm.
We define two types of agents: independent agents and coalition member agents.
These two types are mutually exclusive. Initially all the agents are assumed to be
independent. Ind(vi) refers to a set of independent agents i : v1, v2, ......., vn. An
agent vi makes a commitment Comm(vi, vj) to its neighbor agent vj and forms a
coalition Coa(vi, vj). A coalition member agent is committed to the coalition; it
always cooperates with its neighbors belonging to the same coalition and defects
with others. In other words, it implements the strategy: no cooperation without
commitment. However, an independent agent takes the interaction strategy that the
majority of its neighbors adopted in the previous round. The next sub-section defines
the coalition formation process and the algorithm.
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4.1.3 Definitions, Algorithm and Theorem
Definition 1. Commitment: An agent vi makes a commitment Comm(vi, vj) to its
largest accumulated payoff neighbor vi with whom it intends to form a coalition. The
commitment proposal includes the following:
1. vi would bear a small management cost β to maintain the coalition
2. vi would pay a penalty α if it unilaterally breaks the coalition and vice versa
Definition 2. Coalition Formation: If the accumulated payoff of an independent
agent vi ∈ Ind(vi) is smaller than the accumulated payoff of its neighbor vj whose
payoff is the largest in vi’s neighborhood, i. e., if
∑
u(vi) <
∑
u(vj) and (vi, vj) ∈ E,
then vi forms a coalition Coa(vi, vj) with vj by making a commitment Comm(vi, vj)
as defined in Definition 1. Agent vi cooperates with the members of the same coalition
and defects with others belonging to it’s neighborhood.
As in [4], the management cost is very small compared to the reward, i. e., β << R
and the penalty α is larger than the temptation payoff, i. e., α > T in order to offer
enough incentive to an opponent to form a coalition.
Initially there would be multiple coalitions where agents may find it profitable to
leave their existing coalitions and join new ones. The inter-coalition dynamics is
defined as follows:
Definition 3. Inter-Coalition Dynamics: If the accumulated payoff of a coalition
agent vi is smaller than the accumulated payoff of its neighbor vj that belongs to
another coalition, whose payoff is the largest in vi’s neighborhood, i. e., if
∑
u(vi) <
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u(vj), (vi, vj) ∈ E and Coa(vi) 6= Coa(vj), then vi leaves its existing coalition and
joins the coalition of vj if the following condition is fulfilled:
∑
u(vi)
2
> α
Definition 4. Coalition Convergence: After repeating the Inter-Coalition Dynamics
phase multiple times the network converges into a single coalition where no agent
either finds it beneficial to leave the existing coalition or to form a new one.
In what follows, we describe the algorithms for the proposed coalition formation
approach.
Algorithms: The Coalition Formation with Network Dynamics Algorithm (CFNDA)
has 3 steps: network formation, initial coalition formation and decentralized coalition
formation described below by procedures 1, 2 and 3 respectively (page 88, 89 and 90).
Procedure 1: NetworkFormation
Require: m0 initial nodes
Require: number of edges (m) of the newly
connected node: m ≤ m0
1. setInitialAttractiveness() = A;
2. setClusteringProbability() = p;
3. implementBAModel;
4. WHILE(m ≤ m0)
5. {linkToNode(i):
∏
n→i =
A+degreei∑
j(A+degreej)
;}
6. end;
7 implementExtendedBAModel;
8. linkToNode(i):
∏
n→i =
A+degreei∑
j(A+degreej)
;
9. WHILE(m ≤ m0 − 1)
10. {linkToNeighborOfNode(i)withProbability(p);
11. linkToNode(i)withProbability(p-1):∏
n→i =
A+degreei∑
j(A+degreej)
;}
12. end;
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Procedure 2: InitialCoalitionFormation
Require: Accumulated payoff is transparent
only to immediate neighbors
Require: All the agents are Independent
1. networkFormation();
2. randomStrategySelection();
3. playPDGamewithNeighbors();
4. FOR each agent i:= 1 to n
5. IF maximumPayoffNeighbor(j) AND
6. payoff(i) < payoff(j)
7. offerCommitmentTo(j);
8. formCoalitionWith(j);
9. payManagementCostBy(i);
10. ELSE
11. remainIndependentAgent(i)
12. END FOR
Network Formation: In the beginning agents choose their interaction partners and
form the network as described in Procedure 1. Agents may either form the network
according to the Barabasi-Albert (BA) SF model (lines 3-6) or may use an extended
version of the BA model (lines 7-12). Since the BA model [8] suffers from low cluster-
ing, we also use the extended BA model [30]. According to these two models, agents
are enabled to control the degree-heterogeneity of the network by a model parameter
named initial attractiveness parameter (A). The clustering of the networks can be
controlled using the clustering probability (p). These parameters are defined in the
the description of the BA and extended BA model in Appendix A. In the BA model,
all the links (m) of the new node are connected to the existing nodes using the pref-
erential attachment rule (line 5). On the other hand, in the extended BA model only
the first link of the new node is added using the preferential attachment rule (line
8). The remaining links of the new node (m0 − 1) are added to the randomly chosen
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Procedure 3: Decentralized Coalition Formation Algorithm
Require: Accumulated payoff is transparent only
to immediate neighbors
1. initialCoalitionFormation();
2. playPDGamewithNeighbors();
3. FOR each agent i:= 1 to n
4. IF coalitionAgent(i) AND
5. maximumPayoffNeighbor(j) AND
6. payoff(i) < payoff(j)
7. IF (notIndependentAgent(j))
8. IF u(i)/2 > α
9. {offerCommitmentTo(j);
10. joinCoalitionOf(j);
11. payManagementCostBy(i)};
12. ELSE IF (independentAgent(j))
13. GOTO lines 9-11;
14. IF (coalitionAgent(i) AND
15. disconnectedFromCoalition(i))
16. {becomeIndependentAgent(i)};
17. IF (independentAgent(i))
18. GOTO lines 5-13;
19. mutation();
20. END FOR
neighbors of the first neighbor of the new node with the probability p (line 10) or
using the preferential attachment rule with the probability p-1 (line 11). By varying
the value of A, the degree-heterogeneity of the resultant network can be controlled
and p determines the clustering level of the extended BA model. A computational
model, described in Subsection 4.1.4, determines how the agents should set these two
topological parameters such that the resultant network enhances the emergence of a
single coalition when agents form coalitions using algorithms 2 and 3.
Initial Coalition Formation: Procedure 2 depicts how initial coalitions are formed at
the beginning of the game. Every agent starts out as an independent agent and there
is no coalition. Agents choose their interaction strategy randomly and generate the
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payoff according to the payoff matrix in Table 7 by playing a 2-person PD game with
each one of its neighbors (lines 2-3). Then in lines 5-9, for every agent if the largest
payoff neighbor j’s accumulated payoff is larger than the agent i’s payoff, it offers
commitment to j and forms a coalition. It also bears the management cost of that
coalition. An agent without any coalition members remains independent (line 11).
After the first round, there would be multiple coalitions. The number of coalitions
will depend on the size of the network.
Decentralized Coalition Formation: At the beginning of every round each agent
plays the PD game and employs the coalition strategies to join/leave/switch or form
a coalition according to Procedure 3. In lines 4-11 every coalition member agent i
joins the coalition of it’s largest payoff neighbor j if one-half of i’s payoff is larger than
the penalty. Agent i offers a commitment to j and bears the management cost of the
coalition. If j is an independent agent, then i forms a coalition with it by offering a
commitment and bearing the management cost (lines 12-13). If agent i is a coalition
member agent but is disconnected from its coalition members (when an agent does
not have any one-hop link to other members of its coalition, then it is considered to
be disconnected from its coalition), it becomes an independent agent (lines 15-16).
However, if i is an independent agent then it forms a new coalition according to lines
5-13.
Mutation: It is possible that some agents might become stable within sub-optimal
coalitions where the majority of the neighbors do not belong to the agent’s coalition.
In order to allow these agents to move to optimal coalitions (which maximizes their
payoff), they are enabled to explore the strategy space with a small probability. If
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the majority of a coalition-agent’s neighbors are not its coalition members, that agent
becomes independent if one-half of its payoff is larger than the penalty.
Proposition 1. For any connected graph G with n nodes and (sufficiently) high
penalty (α > temptation payoff), the agents increase their payoff through the coalition
formation process.
Proof. Let us consider three agents a1, a2 and a3 are playing an iterated PD game
with their immediate neighbors. Both a2 and a3 are the neighbors of a1. Assume
that after the first round of the game, the accumulated payoff of a2 is the largest
in a1’s neighborhood, i. e.,
∑
u(a2) >
∑
u(a3) >
∑
u(a1). Now according to the
CFNDA, agent a1 will form a coalition with a2 by making a commitment and will
start cooperating with the same coalition members in its neighborhood. This mutual
cooperation may increase a1’s payoff. However, it is possible that a1 was a defector
with its other neighbors; in that case its payoff would not increase after joining a2’s
coalition.
Now, in the next round of the game, after joining the coalition if the majority
of a1’s neighbors belong to the same coalition, its payoff further increases through
mutual cooperation. With this increased payoff a1 will eventually attract its non-
coalition neighbors to join a1’s coalition. This would result in a maximum payoff of
a1. On the other hand, if the majority of a1’s neighbor do not belong to its coalition
and if one of the neighbors’ payoff happens to be larger than that of a1’s payoff,
then a1 will leave its existing coalition and will form/join that neighbor’s coalition if∑
u(a1)/2 > α condition is satisfied. In the new coalition, a1’s payoff is expected to
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increase further because its coalition partner is the wealthiest in a1’s neighborhood
and thereby it would attract more agents to join its coalition increasing the likelihood
of mutual cooperation. However, this process may lead a1 to a situation where it may
get stuck in a sub-optimal coalition. The mutation strategy of the CFNDA could
resolve this problem by allowing a1 to move towards more beneficial coalitions and
thereby increase its payoff.
Using Proposition 1 now it is proved that the coalition formation algorithm guar-
antees maximum average expected payoff in any scale-free random graph.
Theorem 2. For any random scale-free graph G with n nodes and (sufficiently) high
penalty (α > temptation payoff), the coalition formation process converges into a
single coalition and maximizes the average expected payoff, if the minimum node-
degree (mind), penalty (α), reward (R) and punishment (P) payoffs fulfill the following
condition:
mind ≥
4α
R + P
Proof. According to Proposition 1, it is sufficient to prove that in scale-free random
graphs either a node has earned the maximum payoff (when all of its neighbors
belong to the same coalition) or one-half of its payoff is larger than the penalty to
move to another coalition leading towards the convergence into a single coalition that
maximizes its payoff.
In any random scale-free graph, there are few high-degree nodes linked by many
low-degree neighbors. Since initially the nodes interact based on randomly assigned
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strategies, the interaction partners of any node would be a uniform mixture of co-
operators and defectors. This leads the high-degree nodes to generate high accumu-
lated payoffs in their neighborhood. Therefore, most or all of the neighbors of the
high-degree nodes form coalitions with them resulting all (or almost all)-cooperation
sub-graphs around the high-degree nodes.
Let us assume that a2 and a3 are two high-degree nodes in a1’s neighborhood and
that initially in the first round of the game a1 has formed a coalition with a2. Also
assume that the degree of a3 is larger than the degree of a2, i.e., d(a3) > d(a2).
Therefore the number of cooperating coalition members of a3 should be larger than
that of a2. This would increase the payoff of a3. Hence, in the next round of the
game a1 finds it profitable to leave the coalition of a2 and join the coalition of a3 and
thereby increase its payoff if
∑
u(a1)/2 > α. Now we will prove that this condition
is always satisfied until the entire network converges into a single coalition where no
node has any motivation to leave the coalition.
Let us assume that in the first round of the game when a1 belonged to a2’s coalition,
x number of neighbors of a1 cooperates with it (including the node a2) and the
remaining nodes of its neighborhood (which is at least, minimum degree of a1 or
mind(a1)− x) belong to different coalitions and hence are defectors. Therefore, after
the end of the first round, the accumulated payoff of a1 would be
∑
u(a1) = x ∗R + (mind(a1)− x) ∗ P
Now, in the next round, for a1 to move to a3’s coalition for maximizing it’s payoff,
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a1 needs to satisfy the following condition
x ∗R + (mind(a1)− x) ∗ P
2
> α
We know that α > R > P , hence for the above condition to be satisfied, both x
and mind(a1) have to be sufficiently large. Since initially there were equal number
of cooperators and defectors, it is expected that at least half of a1’s neighbors would
belong to the same coalition. Therefore,
mind(a1)
2
∗R + (mind(a1)− mind(a1)2 ) ∗ P
2
≥ α
=⇒ mind(a1)
4
∗ (R + P ) ≥ α
=⇒ mind(a1) ≥ 4αR+P
Therefore, if the minimum node-degree of G fulfills the above condition, the agents
would tend towards beneficial coalitions, thereby increasing the number of cooperators
in their neighborhood, until all the agents converge into a single coalition in which
mutual cooperation guarantees the maximization of the average expected payoff of
the agents.
4.1.4 Computational Model and Results Analysis
Our plan is threefold: (a) computationally validate the proposed approach by show-
ing that if the penalty is set according to the condition provided in Theorem 2, con-
vergence into optimal coalitions is possible, (b) show that the performance of the
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approach for the emergence of cooperation in moderately connected SF networks is
better than two state-of-the-art approaches and (c) determine the topological insights
that agents could use to choose their partners such that the resulting network facili-
tates cooperation.
For comparison, we specifically use two state-of-the-art action update rules, namely
the imitate-best-neighbor (IB) [45] and the stochastic imitate-random-neighbor (SA) [58],
that has been shown to facilitate the evolution of cooperation in SF networks [29]. The
performance of these rules are studied over varying-degree SF networks. Although
these two approaches do not use coalition formation for the evolution of cooperation,
we investigate these to underscore the challenge of achieving cooperation in moder-
ately connected networks. We use a computational model to conduct extensive simu-
lations for the coalition formation approach by varying the node degree-heterogeneity
and the clustering coefficient of the BA and the extended BA model10. The value
of the initial attractiveness parameter (A) is increased in order to vary the degree-
heterogeneity of the network and increase the value of the clustering probability p
(used in the extended BA model) to generate medium (p = 0.5) and high-clustering
(p = 0.1) networks respectively; and observe the state of convergence of the coali-
tions. Also we investigate how the average expected payoff increases in each type of
network instantiation. Heterogeneity is measured by the standard deviation of the
degree distribution.
10These models are described in Appendix A.
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4.1.4.1 Simulation Setup
The network consists of 5000 agents represented as nodes in the SF network. A
link between two nodes of the network indicates that the agents interact and play the
PD game. The default minimum node degree is set to 10 in both models (m = 10).
The following values for the payoffs are considered: T = 5, R = 3, P = 1 and S =
0. According to Theorem 2, the value of the penalty (α) is set to 10. The value of
the management cost (β) is chosen as 0.005.
All the results reported are averages over 100 realizations for each network for
different values of the network parameters (e.g., degree-heterogeneity, clustering co-
efficient etc.). Each simulation consists of 500 time steps where a time step refers to
a single run of the program. The mutation rate is set to 0.05 [55].
Table 8: IB & SA Rules: The average no. of cooperators (#Coop) and average
expected payoff (ExPoff)
IB SA
Min-
Degree
#Coop ExPoff #Coop ExPoff
1 1337.1 -75.49 1238.28 -78.37
2 2824.55 -31.43 2304.17 -47.41
3 400.81 -111.80 506.15 -108.04
5 0.0 -124.77 49.9 -123.53
10 0.0 -125.31 0.0 -124.92
The results are reported over 100 realizations of the network for various values of the
minimum node degree. Both p and A are zero.
4.1.4.2 Simulation Results
Evolution of Cooperation vs. Minimum Node Degree: The effect of IB and SA
action update rules are investigated over the final fraction of cooperators by varying
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the minimum node degree of the network. BA model (p = 0.0) is used with the initial
attractiveness parameter A set to 0. Table 8 shows that the evolution of cooperation
occurs only when the network is sparse, although extremely sparse networks (where
minimum node degree is 1 or the average node degree is 2) do not facilitate cooper-
ation. The average number of cooperators drops to zero for both update rules when
the minimum node degree exceeds 5. This also results in very low average expected
payoff of the network. However, from Tables 9 and 10 we observe that the proposed
commitment-based dynamic coalition formation approach is able to increase mutual
cooperation by converging into a single coalition and to maximize the average ex-
pected payoff of the agents in moderately connected networks (when minimum node
degree is 10 or average node degree is 20).
Table 9: Commitment-based Coalition Formation in the BA Model: The average no.
of coalitions (#Coa), average expected payoff (ExPoff), average Global Clustering
Coefficient (GCC) and average Degree-Heterogeneity (DH)
BA Model
p = 0.0
A #Coa ExPoff GCC DH
0 1.44 20.21 0.02 52.58
50 1.18 21.76 0.01 27.54
100 1.14 21.74 0.01 25.57
500 1.01 21.98 0.01 23.96
1000 1.04 21.80 0.01 23.73
2000 1.03 21.93 0.01 23.58
5000 1.01 21.89 0.01 23.50
10000 1.00 21.97 0.01 23.48
The results are reported over 100 realizations of the network for various values of p and A.
Convergence of the Network: To observe the performance of the coalition formation
approach over a low-clustering SF network, the initial attractiveness parameter is set
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Table 10: Commitment-based Coalition Formation in the Extended BA Model: The
average no. of coalitions (#Coa), average expected payoff (ExPoff), average Global
Clustering Coefficient (GCC) and average Degree-Heterogeneity (DH)
Extended BA Model
p = 0.5 p = 1.0
A #Coa ExPoff GCC DH #Coa ExPoff GCC DH
0 1.51 20.74 0.13 52.25 1.96 16.46 0.31 52.35
50 2.93 19.60 0.12 34.25 3.66 14.64 0.41 50.65
100 1.08 21.73 0.12 31.43 1.87 20.83 0.42 52.07
500 1.01 22.08 0.12 29.54 3.61 15.85 0.45 49.21
1000 1.10 21.56 0.11 29.19 2.99 17.86 0.45 49.42
2000 1.15 20.62 0.12 29.14 3.11 15.96 0.44 50.07
5000 1.25 20.28 0.12 28.83 1.89 20.38 0.45 50.23
10000 1.19 21.09 0.11 28.99 1.93 20.45 0.46 50.53
The results are reported over 100 realizations of the network for various values of p and A.
to A = 0. Then it is gradually increased from 0 to 10,000. From Table 9 it can be
observed that as A increases, the degree-heterogeneity of the network decreases and
the likelihood of convergence into a single coalition increases. Therefore, clearly the
agents could benefit by selecting their partners by setting a large value of A during
the network formation phase (Procedure I in Subsection 4.1.3). It guarantees the
convergence into a single coalition and maximizes the average expected payoff. The
average global clustering coefficient of the network is very small, as expected from
the standard BA model.
The extended BA model is used to investigate the effect of high clustering and
degree-heterogeneity over the emergence of a single coalition. For both medium-
clustering (p = 0.5) and high-clustering (p = 1.0) networks, the initial attractive-
ness parameter A is increased from 0 to 10,000. From Table 10 we observe that in
the medium-clustered network, very large value of A (> 1000) does not necessar-
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ily improve the convergence.The best convergence can be achieved when A = 500.
Hence, our expectations about improving the convergence by controlling the value
of A are partially met by the results. On the other hand, in the high-clustered
model, very large value of A (> 5000) is required to improve the convergence. In
the high-clustered model we see that even a very large value of A does not decrease
the degree-heterogeneity of the network significantly. The reason is that according to
the extended model of the BA network with p = 1.0, only the selection of the first
neighbor can be controlled by the parameter A.
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Figure 15: BA & Extended BA model: Increase of average expected payoff for various
values of the clustering probability p.
Average Expected Payoff: Figure 15 shows how the average expected payoff varies
over the iterations for 3 network types: low-clustering (p = 0.0), medium-clustering
(p = 0.5) and high-clustering (p = 1.0). The value of A is set to 0 in these models.
We notice that in all these three types of networks the average expected payoff in-
creases and becomes stable at an optimum value. Also we observe that irrespective of
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the network clustering the commitment-based dynamic coalition formation approach
improves the average expected payoff of the network and increases it in a similar
fashion.
4.1.4.3 Discussion
The performance of the commitment-based approach depends on how the value
of the penalty is set. The challenge is to determine an appropriate range of the
penalty that is high enough to incentivize an opponent (larger than the temptation
payoff) but not very high to obstruct the process of convergence into a single coalition.
According to the required and sufficient condition in Theorem 2, for a moderately
connected network with minimum node degree 10 (average node degree 20), this value
should be no greater than 10. Using this value, the convergence can be guaranteed.
Experimentation with different values of the node degree and the penalty (the result is
not reported here) generates similar result. Therefore, unlike the existing approaches
(IB and SA), the proposed approach is able to evolve cooperation and maximize the
average expected payoff both in sparser and moderately connected networks.
We are able to fine-tune the performance of the proposed approach by enabling the
agents to control the topological features (such as degree-heterogeneity and clustering)
during the network formation phase. The agents in a MAS choose their interaction
partners according to the preferential attachment rule of the BA model. In the
extended BA model, a fraction of the nodes (depending on the clustering probability
p) form the links according to this rule. In order to guarantee optimal convergence
of the proposed approach, agents during the network formation phase need to choose
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their interaction partners using a large value of the parameter A. This decreases the
node degree-heterogeneity and thereby reduces the number of large multiple coalitions
that otherwise may lead towards converging into sub-optimal coalitions.
We observe that the average expected payoff in the highly-clustered network (p =
1.0) is not as high as in both the low and medium clustered networks. In highly-
clustered network, a node is connected to its neighbor’s neighbors. Therefore, the
shared management costs across every agent’s neighborhood are relatively high com-
pared to low-clustered networks. This indicates that agent’s partner selection strategy
and the network formation affect the overall social benefit.
4.1.5 Conclusions
This research presents a commitment-based dynamic coalition formation approach
to establish mutual cooperation in large MAS organized as moderately-connected SF
networks. Interactions of the self-interested agents with their immediate neighbors are
captured using an iterated PD game. Unlike many previous works that assume given
pre-established networks, we enable agents to dynamically choose their interaction
partners to form their network. Agents offer a commitment to their wealthiest neigh-
bors in order to form coalitions. A commitment proposal, that includes a high penalty
for breaching the commitment, incentivizes opponent agents to form coalitions inside
which they mutually cooperate and thereby increase their payoff.
We have accomplished the research goals EC-DCF1-2 by:
• Determining analytically, and substantiating through experiments, how the
value of the penalty should be set with respect to the minimum node degree and
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the payoff values such that convergence into profitable coalitions is possible.
• Contributing to the state-of-the-art by establishing cooperation in moderately-
connected networks.
• Also this work is novel in that the agents are capable of controlling some topo-
logical features of the network that results in better convergence and increased
average expected payoff.
4.2 Emergence of Cooperation in Highly-Connected Networks by Altruistic
Agents
Many real-world SF networks, such as social networks, exhibit large average con-
nectivity [2, 21, 25]. For instance, the average connectivity of a node in the Face-
book network is reported to be 190 [72]. Previously it has been shown that imita-
tion based rules (e.g., imitate-best-neighbor (IB) [45] and stochastic imitate-random-
neighbor (SA) [58]) that facilitate cooperation in random networks and sparse SF
networks are unable to establish cooperation in highly-connected SF networks [29].
Also, there exists a strong theoretical argument based on natural selection showing
that high-connectivity among the nodes in SF networks results in diminished or no
cooperation [47]. However there are many instances where it is critical to establish
cooperation in highly-connected networks. For example, achieving consensus among
the social network application users about acceptable privacy settings for individual
applications is a key challenge [27]. Multi-agent based approach could offer a solution
to this problem by establishing cooperation among the user community. Therefore,
the central research question being addressed here is: how to establish cooperation in
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MAS operating on highly-connected SF networks?
This work presents the design of a heterogeneous MAS composed of both the al-
truistic and self-interested agents and shows that it performs significantly better in
highly-connected SF networks. We propose a stochastic influencer altruistic agent
(StIAA) mechanism that is motivated by a novel definition of cooperation [44] in
which the otherwise competing agents decide to aid each other within the space of
their self-interested bounded rationality. The goal is to determine the conditions un-
der which such cooperation thrives. In other words, the self-interested behavior of
the agents is biased to make them cooperate with each other. To do this, we intro-
duce a small proportion of altruistic agents in a self-interested society (similar to the
influencer agents in [23, 41]). The altruistic agents are designed to always cooperate
with their neighbors while the self-interested agents may cooperate or defect since
their objective is to maximize their utility by imitating the strategy of the wealthiest
agents in their neighborhood. However, since agents in SF networks typically only
have partial-observability of their environment (have access only to the information
about immediate neighborhood), it is possible that the self-interested agents may get
stuck in a local maxima. Therefore, these agents are enabled to determine the opti-
mality of their strategies by stochastically trying the strategy of the altruistic agents
in their neighborhood with a small exploration probability [55]. By manipulating
the self-interested behavior of the large majority of the population, the altruistic
agents are able to facilitate cooperation. We analytically show that this probabilistic
exploration creates a cluster of cooperators in SF networks that helps cooperation
evolution. A comprehensive empirical study substantiates this claim.
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In summary, this research hypothesizes that cooperation could emerge and be sus-
tained in self-interested networked societies with the help of only handful of altruistic
agents, and that it does not necessarily require the concerted effort of the entire
society.
4.2.1 Research Goals
We set the following sub-goals for the emergence of cooperation using altruistic
agents (EC-AA) based approach to achieve research goals RG9 and RG10 that we
outlined in Chapter 1(on page 15):
• EC-AA1: Develop a heterogeneous system design approach that is composed
of a large majority of self-interested agents and a small proportion of influencer
altruistic agents to establish cooperation.
• EC-AA2: Determine an upper bound for the percentage of the altruistic agents
to establish cooperation.
• EC-AA3: Investigate exhaustively the efficacy of the altruistic agent based ap-
proach by varying the model parameters such as initial number of cooperators,
temptation level and size of the network.
4.2.2 Stochastic Influencer Altruistic Agent (StIAA) Mechanism
The large majority of the agents in the proposed MAS are self-interested, and there-
fore, they try to maximize their payoff by using the IB action update rule. According
to this rule, each agent imitates the action of the wealthiest agent (including itself) in
the next round. A small proportion of influencer altruistic agents are introduced at
random locations that always cooperate with their neighbors. The idea of influencer
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agents is inspired by the influencer fixed strategy agents in [41, 23]. These IAAs
broadcast their presence in their neighborhood to motivate the SIAs to reciprocate
them. As mentioned earlier, the rational SIAs that increase their payoff by always
adopting the action of their wealthiest neighbors may get stuck into local maxima due
to partial observability of their network. Therefore, they are enabled to determine
the optimality of their action choices (pareto-optimality) by trying the action of their
neighbor IAAs with a small exploration probability pexplore.
In the following, we present an analytical argument in support of the better per-
formance of the proposed StIAA mechanism in SF networks.
4.2.2.1 Analytical Discussion on StIAA’s Performance in SF Networks
In SF networks, due to the degree-heterogeneity, some agents have high-degree
connectivity while the majority of the agents have low-degree connectivity. As a
consequence, the high-degree nodes or the hubs always reap higher accumulated pay-
offs as compared to their low-degree neighbors. If the majority of the neighbors
of a hub node are cooperators, then it generates high payoff by cooperating but
even higher payoff by defecting. Let us consider two hubs which are cooperator
and defector (hC & hD) respectively. Since initially cooperators and defectors are
distributed uniformly in the network, these hubs should have approximately equal
number of cooperator (nC) and defector (nD) neighbors, i.e., nC ' nD ' z/2, where
z is the average node degree of the hub. Therefore, the accumulated payoffs (ACP)
of the two hubs should be: ACP (hC) = nC ∗ R + nD ∗ S ' z/2 ∗ (R + S) and
ACP (hD) = nC ∗T +nD ∗P ' z/2∗ (T +P ). Since T +P > R+S, the fitness of the
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defector hubs would be larger than that of the cooperator hubs. This is the reason
why defection prevails when solely the imitation based strategies are pursued.
However, irrespective of the strategies adopted by the hubs, their accumulated
payoffs are always greater than their low-degree neighbors. Let us consider a low-
degree neighbor of a hub that may act as a cooperator (kC) or a defector (kD), and
its accumulated payoff is z1/2 ∗ (R+S) (when it cooperates) or z1/2 ∗ (T +P ) (when
it defects), where z1 is the average degree of this node. In SF networks, since the
average degree of the hubs are much larger than the that of the low-degree nodes, i.e.
z >> z1, ACP (hC) or ACP (hD) is always larger than ACP (kC) or ACP (kD).
Previously it has been shown that when the agents follow the IB or SA state update
rule, the behavior of the high-degree nodes or the hubs determine the asymptotic state
of the network [29]. A defecting hub can lead its imitating neighbors towards defec-
tion. We find a remedy to this problem in a mechanism called “network reciprocity”
that is able to resist or eliminate the invasion of the defectors [45]. According to this
mechanism, if the cooperators are able to form clusters in which they mutually help
each other, then cooperation evolves and sustains in the network. We now discuss
how our StIAA based approach increases the likelihood of the hubs to form clusters
of cooperators and thereby facilitates cooperation.
In StIAA, the influencer altruistic agents (IAAs) persuade their neighbors to co-
operate. According to StIAA, the defector hubs that follow the IB state update rule
may at some stage explore and reciprocate the strategy of its IAA neighbor. After
becoming cooperators hubs would incur highest accumulated payoff as compared to
their low-degree neighbors and thus would influence them to adopt its current action
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of cooperation. The hubs are interconnected due to the age-correlation among the
nodes in the Barabasi-Albert model of SF networks. At one time-step of the iterative
game it is possible that multiple interconnected hubs adopt (through exploration)
the cooperative action of the IAAs in their neighborhood in the current round and
thereby could lead the entire network towards evolving cooperation.
A small SF network is used as depicted in Figure 16 to illustrate this phenomenon.
In (a) all agents are self-interested (SIAs) except one IAA. In the current round three
SIA’s act as defectors while one SIA cooperates. The accumulated payoff of the
hub would be the largest (2T+2P) in its neighborhood and therefore its neighbors
would adopt its defection strategy in the next round leading the network towards
a defection state. The IAA alone is not able to resist this invasion of the defectors.
However, since the SIAs try the action of their IAA neighbor with a small exploration
probability, the hub may adopt the cooperative action of the IAA in one time-step
as in (b). Again its accumulated payoff would be the largest and, as a consequence,
its SIA neighbors would adopt its cooperation strategy. Thereby the entire network
would evolve into a cooperation state in (c). However, it is important to note that
if one of the neighbors of the hub (other than the IAA) is another hub that has
adopted the action of defection, the cooperative hub may imitate its action and the
network would turn into all-defectors. To resolve this problem both the hubs need to
explore the action of the IAA in the current round. Simulation results indicate that
this indeed happens in one of the time-steps as the network uses many iterations to
finally converge into a majority cooperative state.
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Figure 16: StIAA facilitating cooperation in a SF network: (a) One influencer altru-
istic agent (IAA) and four self-interested agents (SIA) of which three SIAs, including
the hub, behave as defectors; (b) based on payoff differentials, the hub SIA might try
IAA’s cooperation strategy and act as a stochastic reciprocator agent (SRA) (c) all
of the SIAs adopt the cooperation strategy of the hub SRA by following the imitate-
best-neighbor (IB) state update rule.
Algorithm 4: Stochastic Influencer Altruistic Agent (StIAA) Mechanism
Require: Accumulated payoff is transparent only to the neighbors
4.1 begin
4.2 randomStrategySelection()
4.3 randomIAAselection()
4.4 playPDGamewithNeighbors()
4.5 computeAccumulatedPayoff()
4.6 for each agent i:= 1 to n do
4.7 r ← randomDouble()
4.8 if r < pexplore AND neighborOfSIA(i)==IAA then
4.9 i reciprocates the IAA
4.10 else
4.11 i follows the IB rule
4.12 end
4.13
4.14 end
4.15 end
4.16 iterate (Lines 4.4 - 4.13)
4.2.3 Algorithm for StIAA Mechanism
Algorithm 4 describes our StIAA mechanism. Initially the strategies (Cooperate or
Defect) are randomly assigned among the agents and the IAAs are randomly selected;
then agents play the PD game with their neighbors and compute the accumulated
payoffs (Lines 4.4 - 4.13). Then (Lines 4.6 - 4.13) the SIAs try the action of their IAA
110
neighbor with a small probability pexplore. Otherwise the SIAs update their strategies
according to the IB action update rule. This process repeats (Lines 4.4 - 4.15) over
multiple rounds and leads the network into a cooperation state. Since the updating
of the actions depend on the local neighborhood, we implement synchronous update
in which the entire society updates their states simultaneously in discrete time-steps
that gives rise to a discrete-time macro-level dynamics.
4.2.4 Simulation and Results Analysis
We conduct simulations with the following goals: (i) compare the performance of
our proposed StIAA mechanism with the two state-of-the-art imitation based ap-
proaches (IB and SA) and then (ii) perform a comprehensive empirical study on the
performance of StIAA by varying the percentage of the initial number of cooperators,
percentage of IAAs and the temptation payoff values.
4.2.4.1 Network Topology
The agents are situated on a connected topology that constrains the communica-
tions to the immediate neighbor set. An edge between two nodes of the network
indicates that the agents interact and play the PD game.
The experiments are conducted on SF topologies of varying average degrees. In
addition to this, the performance of StIAA is investigated in random (RN) networks as
compared to the performance of the IB and SA action update rules over RN networks.
The SF topologies are generated using the Barabasi-Albert model. The minimum
node degree is varied from 1 to 25 such that average node degree z lies between 2 to
50.
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The random (RN) networks are generated first by adding a random node with
every node in the network. This ensures that no node is isolated. Then we add links
between two randomly selected nodes. The number of these randomly added links is
varied to create networks with varying z in the range of 2 to 50.
4.2.4.2 Simulation Setup
The network consists of 1000 agents represented as nodes in both the SF and
RN networks. A large majority cooperation state (LMCS) is defined as the one in
which 90% or more agents cooperate with each other [31]. In order to investigate the
scalability of StIAA, experiments on 5000 agents SF networks are conducted as well.
The IAAs maintain their cooperation strategy during the course of the simulation.
These agents not only behave altruistically (being always cooperative), but also try
to influence their neighborhood agents to become altruistic (cooperative). Only 5%
IAAs are considered to be the approximate upper bound (the same reported in [23]).
For most of the experiments this value is maintained. However, this number is varied
within the range of 1% to 7% to observe how it affects the performance of StIAA.
Similar to [55], the exploration probability pexplore is set to 0.05. However, for higher
connectivity networks, this value is increased to 0.1 for getting better performance.
The following values for the PD payoff matrix are used in the simulations: R = 1,
P = 0.1 and S = 0. Hence, the incentive to defect, T, is restricted to 1 < T < 2. For
most of our experiments we use the value 1.1 for the temptation payoff. However, this
value is varied within the range 1.1 to 1.9 to investigate its effect on the performance
of StIAA.
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All the results reported are averages over 100 realizations for each network. Each
simulation consists of 10,000 time-steps where a time-step refers to a single run of the
program.
4.2.4.3 Simulation Results
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Figure 17: Plot of average degree (z) vs. number of times each mechanism successfully
converges into a large majority cooperation state (#LMCS) over 100 simulations;
temptation payoff=1.1, initial cooperators=50%, IAA=5%.
Comparison of the Existing Imitation based Approaches with StIAA: Figure 17(a)
113
and 17(b) show the performance of the IB, SA and StIAA for various average degree
RN and SF networks respectively. The network size is limited to 1000 agents. For
each average degree category, 100 network instances are created and three approaches
are used to observe the process of evolution of cooperation. In SF networks, when
the average degree is smaller (z in the range of 4 to 5), SA performs better than IB.
However, as the average degree increases, both IB and SA fail to establish LMCS.
We observe a similar pattern in RN networks in which larger average degree result in
increasingly less or no cooperation.
In sparse SF and RN networks (z ≈ 2), StIAA does not converge into LMCS (as
also observed in case of IB and SA). However, for average degree between 4 to 30,
StIAA converges to LMCS in almost all instances with pexplore set to 0.05. However,
when the average degree lies in the range of 40 to 50, this low value of pexplore does not
lead to LMCS. The results indicate that by increasing this value to 0.1, the likelihood
of cooperation in these highly-connected SF networks can be significantly increased.
The performance of the StIAA in RN networks is not as good as in SF networks.
The main reason for this relatively poor performance is that RN networks do not
have the benefit of skewed degree-distribution. In SF networks, StIAA facilitates
the formation of clusters of cooperators due to age-correlation among the hub nodes;
and as a result cooperation evolves. On the other hand, unlike SF networks, in
RN networks the degree of the nodes are neither very large nor are they intricately
connected. As a consequence, clusters of cooperators are less likely to be formed.
However, StIAA significantly outperforms IB and SA in RN networks.
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Table 11: Effect of the variation of various parameters in 1000 agents SF networks.
For each variation, the table shows the number of times the network successfully
converges into a majority cooperation state (#LMCS) among 100 simulations.
Variation of % of Cooperators & Temptation Payoff (T) (%IAA = 5)
%Coop=10 %Coop=30 %Coop=50
T=1.1 T=1.5 T=1.9 T=1.1 T=1.5 T=1.9 T=1.1 T=1.5 T=1.9
z pexplore #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS
2.054 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.035 0.05 100 27 0 100 27 1 100 28 100
9.981 0.05 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
19.889 0.05 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
29.759 0.05 99 62 6 100 73 14 100 78 12
39.579 0.05 20 0 0 56 1 0 68 5 0
0.1 100 54 1 100 68 3 100 67 3
49.349 0.05 0 0 0 7 0 0 27 0 0
0.1 72 0 0 90 1 0 96 0 0
Empirical Analysis of StIAA
In order to perform a comprehensive analysis of the performance of StIAA mecha-
nism in SF networks, we vary the following parameters: (a) percentage of the initial
number of cooperators (%Coopp), (b) temptation payoff values (T) and (c) percent-
age of the IAAs (%IAA).
Variation of % of Initial Cooperators: Table 11 shows the effect of the variation of
the initial percentage of cooperators for various levels of the temptation payoff values.
First, consider the situation when the temptation payoff value is set to 1.1 (columns
3, 6, and 9). The results indicate that when the initial percentage of cooperator is
very low (10%), even in the most highly-connected networks (40 < z < 50) likelihood
of cooperation is high. For example, in networks with z ≈ 50, exploration probability
of 1.1 establishes cooperation in 72% instances. With the increase in the percentage
of initial cooperators, as in 30% and 50% cooperator networks, LMCS occurs 90% and
96% times respectively. Therefore, it appears that the variation in the percentage of
initial cooperators does not affect the cooperation evolution process very much when
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temptation payoff is as low as 1.1. StIAA is able to evolve cooperation even if the
initial fraction of cooperators is very small (e.g., 10%). Therefore, it is robust against
the perturbation in the number of cooperators and can transform a majority defector
society into a cooperative one.
Variation of Temptation Payoff: However, when the temptation payoff increases be-
yond 1.1, even with 50% initial cooperators the network does not evolve towards
cooperation (columns 10 and 11) in very large neighborhoods (where z is approx.
40 ∼ 50). In other words, the performance of StIAA is sensitive to the payoff value
of temptation. Both the IAAs and exploration probability need to be increased to
facilitate cooperation where benefit of temptation is high.
Table 12: Effect of the variation of IAAs in 1000 agents SF networks. For each
variation, the table shows the number of times the network successfully converges
into a majority cooperation state (#LMCS) among 100 simulations.
Variation of % of IAAs
(%Coop=50, T=1.1)
%IAA=1 %IAA=3 %IAA=7
z pexplore #LMCS #LMCS #LMCS
2.054 0.05 0 0 0
4.035 0.05 99 100 100
9.981 0.05 97 100 100
19.889 0.05 68 100 100
29.759 0.05 29 89 100
39.579 0.05 19 29 92
0.1 32 99 100
49.349 0.05 11 24 26
0.1 21 52 100
Variation of % of IAAs: Table 12 shows the effect of various percentage of IAAs for
a fixed 50% initial cooperators and 1.1 temptation payoff value. It can be seen that
for smaller density of IAA (1% to 3%) StIAA does not always converge into LMCS
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beyond medium average connectivity networks (where z > 20). In case of 1% IAA
the convergence scenario is not satisfactory when the average degree increases. Even
with relatively large value of pexplore (= 0.1), performance does not improve much.
The improvement is not significant in case of 3% IAA. On the other hand, although
7% IAA provides better result, its difference with 5% IAA is not significant (columns
9 and 14). In other words, 5% IAA is a reasonably small number to maintain good
performance. Therefore, this percentage is used as the upper bound for the IAAs.
Scalability of StIAA: In order to study the scalability of StIAA, its performance is
investigated on 5000 agents SF networks with varying degrees within the range 2 to 60.
Figure 17(c) shows that the performance of StIAA is even better than 1000 agents SF
networks. For example, when the average neighborhood size becomes larger (such as
when z is between 40 to 50), more than 80% times LMCS occurs. Further increasing
the neighborhood size (z ≈ 60) shows that more than 70% instances StIAA converges
into LMCS. With an increased exploration rate (pexplore = 0.1), convergence rate is
100% even in very high average degree networks.
4.2.5 Conclusions
This research develops a stochastic influencer altruistic agent (StIAA) mechanism
that is able to establish cooperation in MAS operating organized as highly-connected
SF networks. A small proportion of influencer altruistic agents (IAAs) is introduced
in the self-interested society. The IAAs, irrespective of their payoff, always cooperate
with their neighbors while the self-interested agents (SIAs) try to maximize their
payoff by imitating the wealthiest agent in their neighborhood. In order to check
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the optimality of their actions, the SIAs try the cooperative action of their IAAs
(should there be one) with a small exploration probability. We conduct comprehensive
simulations to evaluate the performance of StIAA.
We have accomplished the research goals EC-AA1-3 by:
• Proposing a heterogeneous system design approach that is composed of a large
majority of self-interested agents and a small proportion of influencer altruistic
agents.
• Showing that StIAA performs significantly better in highly-connected SF and
RN networks than the existing state-of-the-art IB and SA action update rules.
• Determining a realistic upper bound for the percentage of the IAAs (only 5%)
to ensure cooperation.
• Showing that StIAA is robust as it is able to evolve cooperation in societies that
initially has very small fraction of cooperators.
• Showing that StIAA is scalable in that increasing the size of the network does
not degrade its performance.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we presented a topology-aware approach that facilitates the
emergence of social norms in Multiagent Systems (MAS) organized as various types
of networks. The motivation was to solve the norm emergence problem in virtual
societies that are of large size and dynamic in nature. The type of MAS we study
requires not only that a large majority of the population share norms but that such
norms should emerge fast. Because of the dynamic nature of the MAS, norm emer-
gence mechanisms have to be adaptive. We hypothesized that equipping agents in
networked MAS with “network thinking” capabilities facilitate the emergence of so-
cial norms in an effective and efficient manner. Our topology-aware mechanisms solve
the problem of convention emergence within the space of conventional norms and co-
operation emergence within the space of essential norms. Therefore, our conclusions
are separately drawn for these two types of norms.
5.1 Convention Emergence
We explored the challenges characteristic of various sizes of convention spaces
within the domain of convention emergence. Since small convention space prob-
lems can be solved quickly, we emphasized the solvability of our mechanisms. Large
convention space problems are complex and more difficult to solve. At times high-
quality conventions may not exist in the system; this means agents need to create
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better conventions as well as search for one. Hence, we emphasized both solvability
and efficiency of the solution approach.
For small convention space problems, we showed that no existing single simple dis-
tributed mechanism could create convention across various topologies. This claim is
both analytically and experimentally verified. We focused our efforts especially in es-
tablishing norms in MAS organized as scale-free (SF) networks for two reasons: first,
SF networks represent theoretical social networks and hence have many real-world ap-
plications; second, previous works don’t address the importance of network topology
and its influence on creating conventions [75]. Most existing works used specific con-
figurations of SF networks (based on fixed parameter settings) and claimed to derive
general conclusions about the norm emergence phenomenon in these networks [19].
We varied the SF model parameters and experimented with SF networks with low,
medium and high connectivity. We explored the challenge of forming conventions in
sparse SF topologies.
To summarize our approach, first we showed that the state-of-the-art Generalized
Simple Majority (GSM) action update rule did not perform successfully across differ-
ent types of SF networks, particularly in sparse SF networks. We, then, presented a
novel socially inspired technique called accumulated coupling strength (ACS) conven-
tion selection algorithm that was able to create a single convention both in sparse and
densely-connected SF networks. ACS encodes the history of all previous influences
and thereby acts as a social pressure to promote a specific convention. However,
ACS does not perform as well in random (RN) networks as GSM does. To address
this problem, we developed a topology-aware convention selection (TACS) mechanism
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that enabled the agents to predict the global topology based on local information and
then to select a suitable convention emergence algorithm. An extensive simulation on
RN and SF networks showed that a large majority of the agents correctly recognized
their topology and used either GSM (for RN networks) or ACS (for SF networks)
that led to the convergence into a single convention.
For large convention space problems, we hypothesized that if agents were endowed
with the capability of “network thinking”, the convention formation process would
become effective and efficient. To validate this hypothesis, we used a language coordi-
nation problem from [23] for our investigation where a society of agents constructed
a common lexicon in a decentralized fashion. Similar to [23], agents’ interactions
were modeled using a language game. In this game, agents send their lexicons to
their neighbors and update their lexicon based on the utility values of the received
lexicons. We presented a novel topology-aware utility computation mechanism that
enabled the agents to use contextual knowledge to expedite the convention forma-
tion process. Moreover, a socially-inspired technique called the power of diversity
was used. Agents were enabled to bring diversity in the population through network
reorganization that was based on the lexicon utility. Extensive simulation results
indicated that the mechanism was both effective (able to converge into a large major-
ity convention state with more than 90% agents sharing a high-quality lexicon) and
efficient (faster) when compared to two state-of-the-art mechanisms [56] and [23]. In
addition to this, the efficacy of the topology-aware mechanism was tested by varying
the topological features to develop an understanding of the influence of topology on
the convention formation process. The conditions under which diversity was beneficial
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were also investigated.
Following are the contributions related to convention emergence problem. We relate
them to research goals discussed in Chapter 1 in page 12 and put them in the context
of Contribution C1 in page 15:
• For small convention spaces, ACS is able to create a convention in sparse as
well as in dense SF networks. The TACS mechanism enables convention emer-
gence in various topologies including RN and SF networks. This is a part of
contribution C1 which is in response to research goals RG1 - RG3 outlined in
Chapter 1(page 12).
• In large convention spaces, TA mechanism provides an effective and efficient
solution that forms another part of contribution C1 which is in response to
research goals RG4 - RG6 outlined in Chapter 1(page 13).
5.2 Cooperation Emergence
Moderately and highly-connected SF networks present the greatest challenge to
evolve cooperation within the space of essential norms. We presented two mecha-
nisms that solved the cooperation emergence problem across these SF networks. The
first mechanism used a commitment based dynamic coalition formation technique and
complex network dynamics to form cooperation. Agents in the MAS are organized as
SF networks and the mechanism is able to form cooperation in moderately-connected
SF networks (where the average node degree is 20). The second mechanism empha-
sized highly-connected SF networks (where the average node degree is up to 50) and
used a heterogeneous system design approach that included a small fraction of al-
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truistic agents. Highly-connected networks are claimed to be susceptible to defection
and are the most challenging to sustain cooperation. We present our conclusions on
these two mechanisms separately in the following two subsections.
5.2.1 Commitment Based Dynamic Coalition Formation Approach
We developed a commitment-based dynamic coalition formation approach to es-
tablish mutual cooperation in large MAS organized as moderately-connected SF net-
works. Interactions of the self-interested agents with their immediate neighbors were
captured using an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Unlike many previous
works that assume being given pre-established networks, we enabled agents to dy-
namically choose their interaction partners to form their network. Agents offered a
commitment to their wealthiest neighbors in order to form coalitions. A commitment
proposal, that includes a high penalty for breaching the commitment, incentivizes
opponent agents to form coalitions inside which they mutually cooperate and thereby
increase their payoff. We enabled agents, to reason from a network-theoretic perspec-
tive, about determining the value of the penalty with respect to the minimum node
degree and the payoff values such that convergence into optimal coalitions is possible.
5.2.2 Altruistic Agents Based Approach
We developed a stochastic influencer altruistic agent (StIAA) mechanism that is
able to establish cooperation in MAS operating on highly-connected SF networks.
A small proportion of influencer altruistic agents (IAAs) is introduced in the self-
interested society. The IAAs, irrespective of their payoff, always cooperate with
their neighbors while the self-interested agents (SIAs) try to maximize their payoff by
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imitating the wealthiest agent in their neighborhood. In order to check the optimality
of their actions, the SIAs try the cooperative action of their IAAs (should there be
one) with a small exploration probability. We conducted comprehensive simulations
to show that StIAA performed significantly better in highly-connected SF and RN
networks than the existing state-of-the-art action update rules. Moreover, we have
determined a realistic lower bound for the percentage of the IAAs (only 5%) to ensure
cooperation.
The following are the contributions related to cooperation emergence problem. We
relate them to research goals discussed in Chapter 1 in page 12 and put them in the
context of Contributions C2 - C3 mentioned in page 15:
• Our Commitment based Dynamic Coalition Formation approach evolves coop-
eration in moderately-connected SF networks. It fulfills contribution C2 which
is in response to research goals RG7 and RG8 outlined in Chapter 1(page 14).
• Our altruistic agent based approach facilitates the emergence of cooperation in
highly-connected SF and RN networks. It fulfills contribution C3 which is in
response to research goals RG9 and RG10 outlined in Chapter 1(page 15):
5.2.3 Future Work
There are several directions in which this dissertation could evolve in future. For
example, the TACS mechanism for small convention space can be extended to different
types of networks. Also, the accuracy of the agents’ prediction of the global network
topology can be improved. The topology-aware approach for large convention space
can be implemented on other topologies such as community networks [35], local-
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world evolving networks [37] and multiplex networks [70]. Additional future work
include validating the mechanism on bigger convention space problems; considering
malicious agents and error-prone communication; and extending the mechanism for
solving convention problem to traffic assignment application and ontology sharing in
biomedicine as follows.
• Traffic Assignment: The topology-aware convention formation mechanism can
be used to solve the traffic assignment problem for modeling a transportation
system [3]. Unlike centralized classical approaches in which trips are assigned
to links or routes, a multi-agent approach can be used from the perspective of
road users. These users are modeled as agents that autonomously select their
routes in an adaptive way. This traffic convention problem is complex due to
the large number of agents and the number of choices for alternative routes.
Our topology-aware mechanism can be extended to expedite the process.
• Ontology Sharing in Biomedicine: In biomedicine research, shared ontology de-
velopment is an important research problem [80]. An ontology represents the
concepts and their interrelation within a knowledge domain. In biomedicine,
several ontologies have been developed that provide standardized vocabular-
ies to describe diseases, genes and gene products, physiological phenotypes,
anatomical structures, and many other phenomena. Scientists use these ontolo-
gies to encode the results of their experiments and observations. Ontologies are
used to perform integrative analysis to discover new knowledge. The challenge
is to evaluate an ontology’s representation of knowledge within its scientific
domain. This requires developing a model for ontology sharing. Our language
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convention formation approach can be extended to address the ontology sharing
problem in biomedicine research. A multi-agent based system can be designed
in which each agent represents an ontology [66]. Then the research question can
be formulated as: how can agents develop a shared ontology in a decentralized
fashion?
The commitment-based dynamic coalition formation approach and the altruistic
agent based approach can be implemented on other types of networks such as small-
world, regular, etc.
126
REFERENCES
[1] S. Abdallah. Using a hierarchy of coordinators to overcome the frontier effect
in social learning. In the Proceedings of the International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), pages 1381–1382,
2012.
[2] R. Albert and A.-L. Barabási. Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Review
of Modern Physics, 74(1):47–97, Jan. 2002.
[3] L. C. B. Ana. Learning-based traffic assignment: how heterogeneity in route
choices pays off. In 8th International Workshop on Agents in Traffic and Trans-
portation, held at the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems (AAMAS 2014), 2014.
[4] H. T. Anh, L. M. Pereira, and F. C. Santos. The emergence of commitments and
cooperation. In the Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), pages 559–566, 2012.
[5] A. Artikis, L. Kamara, J. Pitt, and M. J. Sergot. A protocol for resource sharing
in norm-governed ad hoc networks. In J. A. Leite, A. Omicini, P. Torroni,
and P. Yolum, editors, Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies (DALT),
volume 3476 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 221–238. Springer,
2004.
[6] S. Assenza, J. Gomez-Gardenes, and V. Latora. Enhancement of cooperation in
highly clustered scale-free networks. In Physical Review, E 78 (017101), 2008.
[7] R. Axelrod. The evolution of cooperation. New York, 1984. Basic Books.
[8] A. L. Barabasi and R. Albert. Emergence of scaling in random networks. In
Science, 286, pages 509–512, 1999.
[9] A. L. Barabsi. Scale-free networks: A decade and beyond. Science, 325:412,
2009.
[10] A. Barrat, M. Barthlemy, and A. Vespignani. Dynamical Processes on Complex
Networks. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2008.
[11] C. Castellano, V. Loreto, A. Barrat, F. Cecconi, and D. Parisi. Comparison of
voter and glauber ordering dynamics on networks. Physical Review E, 71:066107,
2005.
[12] S. Catanese, P. D. Meo, E. Ferrara, G. Fiumara, and A. Provetti. Extraction
and analysis of facebook friendship relations. In Computational Social Networks:
Mining and Visualization. Springer Verlag, London, 2011.
127
[13] C. Cattuto, V. Loreto, and L. Pietronero. Collaborative tagging and semiotic
dynamics. Computing Research Repository (CoRR), 0605015, 2006.
[14] M. Cha, H. Haddadi, F. Benevenuto, and K. Gummadi. Measuring User Influence
in Twitter: The Million Follower Fallacy. In 4th International Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Conference on Weblogs and Social Media
(ICWSM), 2010.
[15] A. Clauset, C. R. Shalizi, and M. E. J. Newman. Power-law distributions in
empirical data. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) Review,
51(4):661–703, Nov. 2009.
[16] J. Coleman. Foundations of Social Theory. Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000.
[17] N. Criado, E. Argente, A. Garrido, J. A. Gimeno, F. Igual, V. J. Botti, P. Nor-
iega, and A. Giret. Norm enforceability in electronic institutions? In Coor-
dination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems VI, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, volume 6541, pages 250–267, 2011.
[18] P. Davidsson and A. Jacobsson. Aligning models of normative systems and
artificial societies: Towards norm-governed behavior in virtual enterprises. In
G. Boella, L. W. N. van der Torre, and H. Verhagen, editors, Normative Multi-
agent Systems, volume 07122 of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings. Internationales
Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fr Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl,
Germany, 2007.
[19] J. Delgado. Emergence of social conventions in complex networks. In Artificial
Intelligence, 141 (1-2), pages 171–185, 2002.
[20] B. DeVylder. The Evolution of Conventions in Multi-Agent Systems. Phd dis-
sertation, Artificial Intelligence Lab Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2007.
[21] S. N. Dorogovtsev and J. F. F. Mendes. Evolution of Networks: From Biological
Nets to the Internet and WWW. Oxford University Press, 2003.
[22] G. Dublon and J. Paradiso. How a sensor-filled world will change human con-
sciousness. Scientific American, 311(1):36–41, 2014.
[23] H. Franks, N. Griffiths, and A. Jhumka. Manipulating convention emergence us-
ing influencer agents. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 26(3):315–
353, May 2013.
[24] R. Glinton, K. P. Sycara, and P. Scerri. Agent organized networks redux. In
the Proceedings of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), pages 83–88, 2008.
[25] R. Guimera and L. A. N. Amaral. Functional cartography of complex metabolic
networks. Nature, 433(7028):895–900, feb 2005.
128
[26] P. Harrenstein, F. Brandt, and F. A. Fischer. Commitment and extortion. In the
Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multia-
gent Systems (AAMAS 2007), page 26, 2007.
[27] M. R. Hasan. Emergence of privacy conventions in online social networks. In the
Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multia-
gent Systems (AAMAS 2013), pages 1433–1434, 2013.
[28] M. R. Hasan, S. Abdallah, and A. Raja. Topology aware convention emergence.
In the Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2014), pages 1593–1594, 2014.
[29] L.-M. Hofmann, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara. The evolution of cooperation
in self-interested agent societies: a critical study. In the Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2011), pages 685–692, 2011.
[30] P. Holme and B. J. Kim. Growing scale-free networks with tunable clustering.
In Physical Review E, 65 (026107), 2002.
[31] J. E. Kittock. Emergent Conventions and the Structure of Multi-agent Systems.
In Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Reading, MA, USA, 1995. Addison-
Wesley.
[32] F. Kooti, W. A. Mason, P. K. Gummadi, and M. Cha. Predicting emerging social
conventions in online social networks. In X. Wen Chen, G. Lebanon, H. Wang,
and M. J. Zaki, editors, the Proceedings of the International Conference on In-
formation and Knowledge Management (CIKM), pages 445–454. ACM, 2012.
[33] P. Kumaraguru and L. F. Cranor. Privacy indexes: A survey of westin’s studies.
Technical report, Institute for Software Research International (ISRI), Carnegie
Mellon University, 2005.
[34] K. Lakkaraju and L. Gasser. Minimizing information-centric convergence cost in
multi-agent agreement problems. In Adaptive Learning Agents (ALA) workshop
at the eighth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
System (AAMAS), 2009.
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APPENDIX A: NETWORK MODELS
In the context of social systems and in many real world applications we observe
that the network exhibits both node degree-heterogeneity and high clustering. The
standard Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free (SF) network model [8], however, suffers
from low clustering. Moreover, the heterogeneous degree-distribution of the BA model
is fixed by the constant power law scaling-exponent. Hence, to emulate more realistic
scenarios, the following two SF network models are presented that is used to build
the computational model in this dissertation.
A Barabasi-Albert Model
The BA SF model [8] is formed as follows:
(i) Growth: Starting from m0 nodes, at every time step a new node is added with
m (m <= m0) edges which connect between the new node and m different previously
existing nodes.
(ii) Preferential Attachment: A node i is chosen to be connected to the new node
according to the probability
∏
n→i =
A+ki∑
j(A+kj)
where ki is the degree of node i and
A is a tunable parameter representing the initial attractiveness of each node. This
parameter controls the degree-heterogeneity of the network.
B Extended Barabasi-Albert Model
The extended model [30] follows the growing process of the BA model that starts
with m0 nodes. At every time step a new node i is added to the network and gets
connected with m (m <= m0) of the previously existent nodes. The first link of node
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i is added to node j of the network (with j < i) following the preferential attachment
rule of the BA model. The remaining m−1 links are added in two different ways: (a)
with clustering probability p the new node i is added to a randomly chosen neighbor of
node j and (b) with probability (1−p) node i gets connected to one of the previously
existing node using the preferential attachment rule again. This procedure ensures a
degree distribution of p(k) ∼ p−γ with a tunable clustering coefficient.
With p = 0, the extended model transforms to the BA model with low cluster-
ing coefficient (at γ = 3). For values of p > 0, the clustering coefficient increases
monotonously. Since this model partially follows the preferential attachment rule of
the BA model (the first link of each new node is added through preferential attach-
ment rule), the heterogeneity of the degree distribution of the extended BA model
can also be controlled by A.
